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ABSTRACT 
  The United States convicts over one million people of felonies each year without 
affording the resources of a trial.  Instead, these convictions are attained in plea bargains.  The 
current research investigated potential differences between pleas and confessions to determine 
whether new experimental research on plea-bargaining is warranted, or whether the research on 
false confessions can be extended to pleas as well.  Given the exploratory nature of this work, 
multiple theoretically-relevant variables were measured so that multiple potential differences 
between pleas and confessions could be explored.  The study employed a 2 (innocent or guilty) x 
2 (plea or confession) x 2 (evidence-bluff or no-bluff) between-participants design.  Participants 
were recruited for a study described as examining problem solving.  Once at the lab, all 
participants were paired with a confederate posing as another participant.  The participant and 
confederate were asked to complete problems both independently (individual) and together 
(team).  Guilty participants were asked to provide help on one of the individual problems by the 
confederate.  Innocent participants were never asked for help.  All participants were later accused 
of cheating on an individual problem.  Participants in confession conditions were then asked to 
sign a statement admitting guilt.  Participants in plea conditions were asked to sign a statement 
agreeing to work 20 hours in the research lab in exchange for dropping the accusation.  
Participants in evidence-bluff conditions were told that a video camera recorded the problem-
solving phase of the study and could reveal whether cheating actually occurred.  The 
theoretically-relevant individual difference variables did not consistently differentiate pleas from 
confessions.  A hypothesized interaction between the evidence-bluff and plea-confession 
conditions on acceptance outcomes did not materialize either.  Nevertheless, some evidence 
emerged indicating that pleas and confessions might involve different processes.  Specifically, 
  
	  
xi 
innocent participants gave different reasons for refusing to sign a plea statement than they did for 
refusing to sign a confession statement.  Similarly, the plea and confession conditions prompted 
guilty participants to provide significantly different reasons for agreeing to sign the statement.  In 
conclusion, the current research provides support for a new line of research on plea-bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Every day in the United States, an average of 2,964 people are presented with a 
profoundly difficult decision—a plea dilemma (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). They can 
choose a certain conviction by plea or an uncertain conviction by trial.  Of course, the choice to 
opt for a trial comes with a cost.  Namely, if convicted by trial, the punishment will be of a much 
greater magnitude than the punishment for conviction by plea.  Faced with this dilemma, most 
people opt for certainty.  In fact, 95% of criminal convictions in the United States are attained in 
plea negotiations, not in courtrooms (Burke, 2007; Ross, 2006).  In other words, the majority of 
criminal suspects accept pleas and forgo the risk of greater punishment if convicted by trial.  
That means an average of 2,816 people are convicted of a felony by plea deal every day, which 
adds up to 1,024,974 people every year (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007).   
 Decision-making in a plea negotiation context is unique and complex.  The vast literature 
on decision-making is thereby limited in its generalizability to plea contexts.  Theory and 
research on people’s decision-making preferences or biases have been predominately tied to 
financial outcomes (i.e., decisions involving money).  From both a measurement and economic 
standpoint, this focus makes perfect sense (Kahneman, 2011).  Money is extremely fungible and 
can be easily quantified.  Plea outcomes on the other hand, especially in a criminal context, can 
rarely be measured in dollars and cents.  While monetary outcomes are measured on the same 
quantitative scale, time in prison, time on probation, time with a criminal record, and time as a 
convicted criminal, represent outcomes that cannot be readily compared.  An outcome of 500 
dollars is objectively better than an outcome of 50 dollars; an outcome of 500 days on probation 
is not objectively better or worse than an outcome of 50 days in prison, especially when 
combined with the accompanying differences in legal costs, criminal records, and other related 
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variables.  Thus, plea-bargaining represents a novel and needed extension to the broader 
decision-making domain.   
A Unique Social Psychological Question 
Plea-bargaining also represents a unique and dynamic social situation that involves a 
number of potential psychological phenomena.  Social psychology has demonstrated the 
frequency with which people can make decisions and engage in behaviors that seem completely 
inexplicable to outside observers.  Thus, the question as to why an innocent person would accept 
a plea bargain seems perfectly suited to social psychology—historically, social psychologists 
have asked many questions that seem to share a common thread.  Why would normal students 
choose to subject a stranger to shocks of up to 450 volts (Milgram, 1963)?  Why would a sample 
of mentally stable individuals transform into seemingly sadistic prison guards (Haney, Banks, & 
Zimbardo, 1973)?  The answer to all these questions seems to involve one of the central tenets of 
social psychology—situations are powerful.  Certain situations can cause people to act in strange 
ways (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1973).  The famous Stanford Prison Experiment 
epitomizes this central tenet (Haney et al., 1973).  A random sample of mentally stable male 
college students were transformed into sadistic prison guards and docile prisoners in a period of 
just six days.  Further, the researchers found that initial measures of personality and disposition 
accounted for a minute amount of variation in the behaviors exhibited during the experiment 
(Haney, et al., 1973).  The prison situation was powerful enough to limit individual differences 
such that guards and prisoners became what their role demanded.   
Findings such as these have led researchers to propose an interactionist perspective to 
account for people’s behaviors.  Essentially, although not everyone reacts to situations in the 
same way, certain situational variables can have a more predictable impact on the behaviors of 
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most people (Haney & Zimbardo, 2009).  Social psychology has long recognized the power of 
novel situations to affect people’s behaviors in ‘unnatural’ ways.  So, why would an innocent 
person accept a plea?  Social psychology provides the context for recognizing the situational 
variables that could contribute to answering this question. 
More specifically, research on conformity and obedience can provide clear insight into 
plea negotiation contexts.  A State or prosecuting attorney—an individual who criminal suspects 
could perceive as an authority figure—orchestrates plea negotiations.  People have a general 
propensity to cooperate with authority (Milgram, 1963).  Thus, it seems possible that people in a 
plea situation would be more willing to accept the agreement to cooperate with a perceived 
authority.  Additionally, it is common practice for prosecutors to convey extreme confidence in 
their ability to ‘get convictions’ when engaged in plea negotiations (Bibas, 2004).  This assured 
persona could perpetuate further social influence by biasing defendants’ perceptions of their 
cases and the strength of evidence against them.  The State attorney could also be perceived to 
possess an experiential knowledge of the legal system that the defendant lacks.  Defendants 
could consequently be led to believe exactly what the prosecutor appears to believe—that going 
to trial would simply mean a worse punishment because conviction is assured either way 
(Wegener & Carlston, 2005).  Further, research has shown that people are more prone to relying 
on these types of cognitive biases when the situation is ambiguous (Cialdini, 2001).  Thus, the 
numerous unknowns in the plea context (e.g., probability of conviction, jury composition, etc.) 
could exacerbate the impact of social influence.   
Finally, people tend to have a bias toward convergence (Sherif, 1935).  One could 
imagine a situation in which an innocent defendant has been implicated with two or more co-
defendants (e.g., they have all been suspected of committing a theft together).  If multiple co-
  
	  
4 
defendants accept plea deals, this could greatly increase the propensity of the remaining 
defendant to accept a plea.  The last defendant might feel pressured to converge upon the same 
decision as the other defendants.  Further, the decision of the co-defendants to plea might also 
affect the perceptions of the remaining defendant regarding the probability of conviction at trial.  
Perceptions can be altered to match the perceptions of others, especially if there are multiple 
others in agreement (Asch, 1952).  Given the various psychological phenomena that can be 
connected to plea bargains, social psychology is the ideal domain with which to examine 
behaviors that occur in this context.  
A New Research Domain? 
 Plea decisions involve a vast array of complex variables that are not easily translated to 
existing decision frameworks and paradigms.  Further, despite the number of social variables 
involved in plea negotiations, experimental investigations into plea behaviors have been sparse 
(Redlich, 2010a).  This fact is especially troubling when considering the predominance of plea-
bargaining in the American criminal justice system.  A handful of researchers have recently 
taken interest in plea-bargaining.  Some have even made explicit calls for further experimental 
plea research (Redlich, 2010a).  In fact, the 2014 American Psychology-Law Society conference 
included three full symposia dedicated to plea-bargaining from a psycho-legal perspective (that 
is in contrast to previous years in which there were no sessions entirely dedicated to plea-
bargaining).  It is possible, however, that this recent drive to create a new domain of research on 
plea-bargaining is unwarranted.        
Plea decisions share several characteristics with confession decisions (Redlich, 2010a).  
Both involve a situation in which suspects accused of an offense are pressured to sign a legal 
statement by a perceived authority (e.g., police, prosecutors).  It is possible that the similarities 
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between confessions and pleas render separate research domains moot.  Perhaps psychological 
and legal variables impact plea and confession outcomes in parallel ways.  If pleas and 
confessions are largely the same, researchers should emphasize these connections and bridge the 
two fields.  If, on the other hand, certain variables impact plea outcomes and confession 
outcomes differently, then current pushes for plea research will be further justified.  Thus, to 
effectively establish the importance of plea-bargaining as its own research domain, it must be 
demonstrated that it has unique properties separate from the seemingly-related confession 
domain.   
 The current research investigated whether certain variables would impact or interact with 
plea and confession outcomes differently.  To accomplish this, I altered an experimental 
confession manipulation and examined whether it had the same impact on plea and confession 
behaviors in a modified cheating paradigm.  I also measured theoretically-relevant individual 
difference variables to determine whether they exhibited distinct relationships with plea and 
confession outcomes.  This introduction is organized into three primary parts.  The first part will 
review the impact of plea-bargaining on American criminal procedure.  This review will also 
include a history of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have contributed to the predominance 
of plea-bargaining today.  The second part will compare and contrast pleas and confessions more 
broadly.  It is important to note that this part relied on several theoretical assumptions due to the 
lack of existing experimental research on pleas.  The hypothesized similarities of pleas and 
confessions will be examined first followed by their hypothesized differences.  The third and 
final section will review the plea-bargaining literature in both legal and psychological domains.  
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Legal Foundation 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide guidelines for the legal prosecution of 
criminal suspects.  They are regularly amended to reflect the most recent rulings made by the 
United States Supreme Court (Judicial Conference of the United States, 2010).  These 32 rules 
detail all of the components of a criminal case and the constitutional protections guaranteed to 
every suspect at each step of the process.  Accordingly, every criminal suspect is afforded the 
right to these procedures.  One such suspect, processed through the American criminal justice 
system, is named Kerry Max Cook.  
Kerry Max Cook was arrested on August 5th, 1977 for the rape and murder of Linda Jo 
Edwards (Cook, 2007).  Two weeks after his arrest, Cook was presented before a judge in an 
examination hearing—these hearings serve to acquire an initial plea of guilty or not guilty from 
the suspect and to retain legal counsel if the defendant has not done so already (in accordance 
with Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).  At this initial hearing, the judge denied 
Cook bail terms due to the violent nature of the crime for which he was accused.  This decision 
guaranteed that he could not be released from custody prior to his trial.  On September 20th, 
1977, a bond hearing was held during which a grand jury officially charged Cook with Capital 
Murder—a crime punishable by lethal injection (in accordance with Rule 5.1).   
On June 22nd, 1978, almost one year after Kerry Max Cook’s initial arrest, his trial finally 
began.  During the trial, Cook was presented with all the evidence the State had collected against 
him (Rule 16), and his attorneys were provided the opportunity to cross-examine all adversarial 
witnesses (Rule 26).  He was also allowed to call his own witnesses, build his own evidence, and 
present his own theory of the facts (Rule 27).  After the State and his defense rested their cases, 
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he was granted the right to receive a final verdict from a jury of his peers (Rule 31).  After a 
verdict of guilty was returned, a separate sentencing judgment was rendered following the 
presentation of evidence supporting the State’s recommended sentence (Rule 32).  On June 29th, 
1978, Kerry Max Cook was sentenced to death by lethal injection.       
Cook spent 19 years on death row.  For 19 years he was subjected to physical abuses, 
rapes, and attempted suicide twice—the second time he left a note stating, “I really was an 
innocent man…”.  In November of 1996, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned 
Cook’s conviction citing repeated episodes of prosecutorial misconduct.  This decision 
effectively wiped away all legal procedures occurring after Cook’s arrest in 1977.  After 20 years 
of imprisonment, Cook was subjected to a second round of criminal procedure.  He was 
presented before a judge who set the terms of bail (bail terms were granted to him the second 
time around).  After meeting his bail requirement, Cook was released to await his trial.  During 
this time, the State prosecutor offered Cook several plea deals—he rejected all of them, 
adamantly refusing to claim responsibility for a crime he did not commit.  On the first day of 
jury selection, the State offered Cook a plea deal that required no admission of guilt and included 
a sentence for time served.  The deal would release Cook from incarceration immediately.  Cook 
reluctantly agreed to the deal, but only after altering the evidentiary form to reflect his 
innocence—a stipulation that his defense team assumed would be a deal-breaker.  The State 
prosecutor agreed to accept the amended plea. 
Shortly after, the court upheld and approved the final plea.  This illustrates an important 
component of plea deals.  Once a State attorney and defendant have agreed upon the terms of a 
plea, the deal must be evaluated and approved by a court.  Depending on the jurisdiction and the 
type of crime, either a judge or jury could be responsible for evaluation of the plea deal.  
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However, it must be noted that the procedure required for a judge or jury to render a final plea 
judgment does not resemble a trial in any way.  The process is much less rigorous than full trial 
proceedings and requires very little time.  Case in point, the court took less than ten minutes to 
approve the plea deal in Cook’s case (Cook, 2007)—the only plea deal accepted in a Capital 
Murder case without an admission of guilt in Texas history.  It was also the only plea deal 
accepted in a criminal case that did not include a signed stipulation of evidence form in U.S. 
history.   
This plea deal effectively replaced several of the previous rules of criminal procedure.  
Cook was not afforded a second trial—consequently depriving him of all the related benefits of a 
trial such as: confronting his accusers, cross-examining adversarial witnesses, receiving a verdict 
from a jury of his peers, etc.  The procedure followed for Cook’s second time through the justice 
system resembled the procedure for most criminal defendants.  The full Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (2010) represent the exception to the criminal justice process rather than the 
rule (despite the title).  For most suspects, the procedural process ends at the examination or 
bond hearing—both of which provide an opportunity for the accused to enter a plea.  Once 
suspects have entered a plea of guilty or accepted a plea deal, the process is over.  All other 
constitutional rights are waived.  The State has won.  The conviction is made.  Although it is an 
excepted truism that every recommended procedure will realistically have its exceptions, the 
current rule of law has shifted dramatically.  Plea bargaining is no longer an exception to the 
general rules of law.  Plea bargaining is the new rule (Fisher, 2000).   
Supreme Court Cases 
 Plea-bargaining has served an influential role in our justice system for decades.  Its legal 
recognition by the courts, however, is fairly recent.  Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
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legitimization of plea-bargaining, it is a well-accepted fact that plea deals were still regularly 
made—they just occurred outside public record or knowledge (Fisher, 2000).  State prosecutors 
would offer suspects explicit promises of leniency in exchange for their waiver of certain rights, 
primarily the right to a trial.  Suspects who wanted to plea were consequently, required to trust 
the word of a lone prosecutor.  This trend toward backdoor dealings began to transform in the 
late-1960s when the U.S. Supreme Court made a series of rulings legitimizing plea bargaining 
practices (Fisher, 2000).  These decisions helped pave the way for plea-bargaining’s dominance 
in today’s criminal justice system.   
 In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that the State was required to record a defendant’s 
waiver of rights prior to accepting a plea deal (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969).  Specifically, the Court 
ordered that defendants be reminded that a guilty plea waives their right against self-
incrimination, right to a trial by jury, and right to confront one’s accusers (a previous decision 
had already required the recording of a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel upon entering a 
plea, Moore v. Michigan, 1957).  Blackledge v. Allison (1977) furthered the requirement for plea 
records.  The Court ruled that a verbatim transcript had to be created to document in-court plea 
bargain proceedings.  The Court reasoned that determining whether plea deals were unfulfilled 
would be nearly impossible in the absence of such documentation.  
 Brady v. United States (1970) was one of the most important decisions in authorizing the 
practice of plea-bargaining.  In this case, the defendant pled guilty to kidnapping but later 
claimed his plea was the result of coercion—he only pled guilty due to promises of sentence 
reduction and clemency.  This case required the Supreme Court to judge the constitutionality of 
plea-bargaining’s most fundamental component.  Determining whether the practice of providing 
explicit promises of leniency in exchange for a waiver of fundamental rights was constitutional.  
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The leniency offered during plea negotiations is typically referred to as the plea discount or trial 
penalty—these two titles illuminate an important distinction.  If plea negotiations resolve to 
punish defendants who would choose to exercise their rights to a trial, the practice should be 
ruled unconstitutional (in accordance with United States v. Jackson, 19681).  If instead, plea 
bargaining is the inevitable result of an overburdened court system willing to offer benefits to 
defendants who freely choose to expedite their cases, it should be deemed constitutional.  This 
decision officially legitimized plea-bargaining by viewing it in the latter perspective—plea deals 
simply offer discounts to those willing to accept them, not punish those who are not.  Further, the 
decision encouraged that prosecutors only pursue pleas for crimes they can support by probable 
cause. 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) expanded this decision by allowing prosecutors to bargain 
not only with sentencing outcomes but also with filed charges.  Hayes was indicted for forgery in 
the amount of $88.30, a crime punishable by a two to ten year prison sentence.  The prosecutor 
offered Hayes a plea deal for which he would recommend a jail term of five years.  He also said 
that if Hayes rejected the deal, he would pursue an indictment under a habitual criminal act based 
on Hayes’ previous two felony convictions.  This charge would result in mandatory life 
imprisonment.  Hayes rejected the plea and the prosecutor kept his word pursuing an indictment 
for fraud as a habitual criminal.  The Supreme Court upheld his conviction stating that, “Plea 
bargaining flows from ‘the mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors… acceptance 
of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty 
plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining 
process.  By hypothesis, the plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this case the Court ruled a provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act unconstitutional because it indiscriminately 
imposed the death penalty upon defendants who chose to assert their right to a trial by jury and were consequently 
convicted. 
2 On its face, this study appears identical to Wilford (2012).  Unfortunately, the researchers altered their study in 
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lenient sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty 
upon conviction after a trial” (p. 364).  The Court also compares plea bargains to many other 
“give-and-take” negotiations and states that no form of punishment or retaliation could be seen in 
a prosecutor’s actions as long as the defendant maintains the freedom to accept or reject the 
offer.  The Court also argued that the prosecution and defense are on relatively equal grounds in 
making these concessions and gains.  The Court later affirmed and furthered this decision by 
concluding that acts of prosecutorial vindictiveness were essentially impossible during the plea-
bargaining phase of criminal procedure (United States v. Goodwin, 1982).  These decisions 
ultimately led to the nearly limitless capacity of prosecutors to get pleas by threatening 
defendants.      
 Santobello v. New York (1971) furthered plea recording requirements stating that final 
plea deals must be written and maintained on public record.  This decision was the first to 
recognize a plea deal as a type of contract between the prosecutor and the defendant.  A judge or 
jury always has the power to reject the terms of that contract in which case defendants should be 
granted the opportunity to withdraw their pleas.  Ricketts v. Adamson (1987) solidified the 
perception of plea deals as a contractual agreement by allowing a defendant to be re-tried after he 
breached his plea agreement (i.e., the defendant was denied an appeal for protection under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause).  Although the Court has recognized the requirement of the state to 
abide by plea deals, it has also ruled that the state has no obligations to abide by any plea offer 
until it is finalized.  Prosecutors are free to withdraw any proposed plea offer and present offers 
with less favorable terms at any time until a judge or jury approves the deal (Mabry v. Johnson, 
1984).  The Court has essentially legitimized plea deals as a public contractual agreement 
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between the suspect and the State—unfortunately, the State has been provided numerous 
indulgences that practically guarantee the upper hand at the bargaining table.  
 The Court has also recognized plea-bargaining to be such a crucial stage in criminal 
justice proceedings that defendants engaged in plea-bargaining are extended the right to effective 
and competent counsel (Hill v. Lockhart, 1985).  Strickland v. Washington (1984) created a two-
prong test to determine whether counsel was ineffective at trial and this same test has been 
extended to plea negotiations.  Defendants may undermine the entrance of a guilty plea on the 
grounds that “but for ineffective assistance of counsel,” the defendant would have rejected the 
plea deal and insisted on a trial.  In two major cases just decided in 2012, the Court also extended 
this test to situations in which defendants reject a plea deal due to improper legal counsel (Lafler 
v. Cooper; Missouri v. Frye).  Consequently, defendants can now seek habeas relief for rejected 
plea deals if those rejections resulted from poor legal advice (Rufo, 2009).       
 In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has an interesting history of plea-bargaining 
opinions.  These decisions have succeeded in legitimizing plea-bargaining practices thereby 
extending their recognition to the courtroom (and promoting them from secret backdoor dealings 
by prosecutors).  Final deals must now be recorded and made public so that both sides can be 
held to their agreements.  Defendants must be provided with an explicit review of the rights they 
are waiving and must have access to effective counsel during the process.  These decisions have 
also granted the State a limitless capacity to define the terms of such deals.  According to these 
decisions, the Court has affirmed that as long as the defendant has the freedom to reject the plea, 
the State cannot be guilty of coercion.   
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Pleas Versus Confessions 
Plea and Confession Similarities 
 Plea negotiations occur in a context that seems very similar to interrogations.  Both pleas 
and confessions are secured by State representatives—attorneys or legal officials.  Further, 
methods used by the State to secure both pleas and confessions have elicited concerns that the 
processes are unduly coercive and could assuage both the guilty and the innocent.  Relatedly, 
many scholars believe that the number of cases involving false confessions or false plea 
convictions is vastly underestimated (Redlich, 2010a).  The term false plea convictions will be 
used to refer to incidents in which an innocent defendant accepts a plea deal and is consequently 
convicted.  Documented cases of both false confessions and false plea convictions are difficult to 
uncover and even more difficult to verify. Further, both pleas and confessions are damning to a 
defense.  Plea deals, by definition, result in a conviction.  However, confessions have been 
considered equally damaging—defendants are rarely acquitted after confessing.  Identifying and 
discussing these similarities is an important component in determining if and how pleas and 
confessions are distinguishable from each other.   
Documented Cases   
The current number of known false confession cases is thought to represent a small 
fraction of the total number of false confession cases (Kassin, 2005).  Similarly, the even smaller 
number of documented false plea convictions is considered a gross underestimation of the actual 
number of false plea convictions (Redlich, 2010a).  Despite this general similarity, it is notable 
that the number of documented false confession cases is significantly higher than the number of 
documented false plea convictions.  False confessions have contributed to approximately 25% of 
wrongful convictions exposed by the Innocence Project (Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012).  
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Given this exposure, it is no surprise that confessions have been such a well-researched 
phenomenon (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Kassin, 2005; Kassin, 2008; Kassin, 2012).   
Only a handful of documented wrongful convictions involved false plea convictions 
(Redlich, 2010a).  However, a number of variables could be potentially contributing to this 
difference in documentation.  First, the Innocence Project (and similar organizations) serves as 
the primary source for reporting factors that contribute to wrongful convictions.  Due to the 
volume of cases that the Innocence Project receives, stringent criteria must be applied to 
determine the cases they choose to pursue.  This often means that cases in which the defendant 
accepted a plea deal are excluded from consideration (Redlich, 2010b.).  Second, exonerating 
evidence, like DNA, tends to only exist for severe crimes (e.g., rape, murder) and plea deals are 
less common for severe crimes.  In 2006, for instance, the proportion of murder convictions 
resulting from plea deals was only 52%.  Driving-related convictions, on the other hand, were the 
result of pleas 96% of the time (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).  Third, plea convictions are 
extremely difficult to overturn.  By accepting a plea deal, defendants waive their right to several 
types of appeal (e.g., challenges of coerced confession, claims of improper grand jury selection, 
prosecutorial defects, claims of illegal search and seizure, denial of due process rights to a 
speedy trial, and challenges based on an entrapment defense, Eisen & Rooney, 2002).  To 
provide an example, I will return to the case of Kerry Max Cook discussed earlier.  Two months 
after Cook was released, his defense attorney filed a request for results from a DNA test of 
semen found on the murder victim’s underwear (Cook, 2007).  The test matched a man with 
whom the victim had been having an affair—a man who denied having had any sexual contact 
with her for weeks prior to the murder.  Although this evidence might normally be considered 
exonerating, Smith County continues to assert that Cook is guilty, and that his decision to accept 
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a plea supports his guilt.  Today, over 15 years after these DNA results were released, Cook is 
still the convicted murderer of Linda Jo Edwards and the actual culprit is still at-large (Grissom, 
2012; Hall, 2012).  
Despite these hurdles, a number of overturned plea convictions have been documented.  
In 1998, an LAPD officer named Rafael Perez was arrested and charged with drug possession, 
forgery, and grand theft auto.  Perez reluctantly agreed to a plea deal that led to the exposure of 
the Rampart scandal—a widespread pattern of corruption and illegal behaviors by a special unit 
of the LAPD known as the Rampart CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) 
unit (Kaplan, 2009).  Police were found to have secured convictions by engaging in perjury and 
planting evidence.  As a result, over 100 criminal convictions have since been reversed 
(Williams, 2001).  In at least 32 cases, police were found to have completely fabricated evidence 
and 25 of those cases were settled in plea negotiations (Covey, 2011).  Defendants who did not 
accept a plea deal suffered punishments five times greater when sentenced at trial.  Another 
police misconduct scandal occurred in Tulia, Texas—Tulia defendants who refused plea deals 
suffered sentences 13 times harsher than those who accepted plea convictions (Covey, 2011).   
Shortly after Tulia, a similar scandal unfolded in Hearne, Texas.  On November 2nd, 
2001, 27 people were arrested in a drug sweep predicated primarily on testimony provided by a 
confidential informant (Bikel, 2004).  Seven of the suspects pled guilty and were then released 
from prison.  Those who could not make bail and refused to plea remained in jail for over five 
months.  After a single day of trial, the critical testimony of the confidential informant was 
discredited.  Shortly after the informant’s dismissal, the charges against all the suspects were 
dropped, except for the seven suspects who accepted plea deals.  Those seven people remain 
convicted (Bikel, 2004).  Sadly, that caveat disqualifies the Hearne scandal as a true example of 
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overturned plea convictions.  Regardless, these scandals show that the innocent do accept pleas.  
They also illuminate some of the factors that can drive them to do so (e.g., prison time, distrust 
of the system, large plea discounts, etc.). 
Both plea and confession research benefit from anecdotal cases that support the need for 
systematic reform, and illuminate potential variables to be researched.  Documented false 
confessions are more plentiful in number than documented false plea convictions, but researchers 
in both camps assert that these known cases represent a small fraction of the full problem.   
Waiving Your Rights 
When defendants confess, they effectively waive several of their constitutional rights 
(e.g., the right against self-incrimination).  Similarly, defendants who accept a plea deal must 
verbally assent to waiving several of their constitutional rights (e.g., the right to a trial).  As 
previously discussed, the Supreme Court has required that defendants waive these rights 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.  Further, the waiver of these rights must be noted on 
public record.  Unfortunately, these guidelines seem to be more formalities than safeguards.  
Although Federal guidelines require that certain procedures be followed, they do not include any 
explicit script or instruction regarding how these rights should be waived (Rogers, Harrison, 
Shuman, Sewell, & Hazelwood, 2007).  Miranda rights, for instance, are only required to include 
certain components (e.g., the right to remain silent) but no exact structure is enforced.  This 
freedom for jurisdictions to format Miranda rights independently has resulted in extreme 
variation across the country.  In some jurisdictions, Miranda rights comprehension would require 
a high-school reading level whereas others would only require elementary reading levels 
(Rogers, Hazelwood, Sewell, Harrison, & Shuman, 2008).  This is particularly problematic 
considering the large proportion of criminal suspects who possess little formal education.   
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One study has surveyed defendants’ comprehension of the rights waived when accepting 
plea deals (Redlich & Summers, 2012).  Defendants were asked a series of questions regarding 
their understanding of the rights they waived when entering a plea and the consequences of 
accepting a plea deal.  The average performance on the questions was 55% and two-thirds of the 
respondents were correct on less than 60% of the items.  Thus, it seems unclear whether 
defendants convicted of crimes by plea deal, waived their rights voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. 
Regardless of whether rights are accurately comprehended, of more direct relevance to 
both confessions and pleas is whether rights are waived.  As previously reported, 95% of 
criminal convictions in the United States are the result of plea convictions (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2007).  Thus, a large proportion of defendants choose to waive the constitutional rights 
necessary to accept a plea.  From the confession context, Kassin and Norwick (2004) conducted 
a study in which participants were either innocent or guilty of a theft.  All participants were then 
asked to waive their Miranda rights and submit to questioning about the offense.  Overall, 58% 
of the total participants waived their Miranda rights thereby permitting the experimenter to 
interrogate them.  Similarly, in a field study on interrogation, 74.7% of criminal suspects waived 
their Miranda rights and never re-invoked them (Leo, 1996).  Thus, although both plea and 
confession contexts invoke safeguards that require explicit waivers of rights, research and reality 
have shown that the majority of people in both contexts still waive their rights.        
Strength Toward Conviction 
Plea deals, by their very definition, guarantee a conviction outcome.  False confessions, 
although not definitively equivalent to convictions, are known to be associated with a high 
likelihood of conviction.  Investigators have been known to overlook any evidence that 
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contradicts a confession, furthering their belief that the suspect who confessed is the guilty 
suspect (Martin, 2011).  In one such case, the district attorney responded to exonerating DNA 
evidence by stating that “… I know because I trust my detective and my tape-recorded 
confession.  Therefore the results [of the DNA test] must be flawed until someone proves to me 
otherwise” (p. 433, Kassin, 2012).  Even in the face of mismatched DNA, the perceived veracity 
of confessions often cannot be toppled.     
Expectedly, participant-jurors confronted with a confession produce a conviction rate that 
is significantly greater than those who hear the same case without a confession.  More 
interestingly, when participant-jurors are presented with a confession that they themselves 
recognize to be coerced, the coerced confession still increases conviction rates (from 19% when 
there was no confession to 47% when there was a coerced confession; Kassin, 2008).  Another 
study showed that even DNA can be trumped by a false confession (Kassin, 2012).  When 
participants were presented with a case in which the suspect confessed, but the defense presented 
exculpatory DNA evidence (e.g., semen not matching the suspect), participants’ propensity to 
convict the defendant was relatively low (10%).  This conviction rate jumped back up to 33% 
however, when the prosecution produced a theory “explaining” why the DNA evidence did not 
match the suspect (e.g., the discovered semen was left from a consensual lover and the defendant 
could not ejaculate during the crime).  This finding is particularly troubling given the tendency 
for prosecutors to actually produce theories like the one used in this study (known now in some 
legal circles as the “unindicted co-ejaculator” theory; Martin, 2011).  In one particularly 
egregious case, after a DNA test excluded the convicted rapist and murderer (who confessed 
only after 24 hours of interrogation), the prosecutor argued at re-trial that the 11-year-old victim 
was sexually active and that the DNA belonged to one of the victim’s previous lovers.  This 
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seemingly outrageous theory convinced a jury to re-convict the suspect despite the mismatching 
DNA.  The almost unfaltering belief in confessions has led researchers to hypothesize that a 
confession (even if coerced) biases the entire investigation—the confession-corruption 
hypothesis (Kassin et al., 2012).  In effect, once a confession is secured, a legal investigation is 
transformed to a legal confirmation.  Officials are simply motivated to collect additional 
evidence to support what they believe they already know from the confession.  In support of this 
hypothesis, analyses of exoneration cases have shown that false confession cases, when the 
confession is secured first, are more likely to lead to multiple investigation errors (e.g., 
eyewitness mistakes, invalid or improper forensic science; Kassin et al., 2012).  Thus, in theory, 
confessions do not always end cases with convictions; in practice, however, the preponderance 
of evidence shows they often do.  
Interestingly, research has shown that cases in which a defendant confesses are also more 
likely to be resolved with a plea deal.  In an analysis of exoneration cases, Redlich (2010a) found 
that exonerees who had falsely confessed were four times more likely to accept a plea deal than 
those who had not confessed.  In another analysis of a separate pool of exonerees, this general 
pattern was replicated—false confession cases were significantly more likely to be resolved by a 
plea deal than cases not involving a confession (Kassin, 2012).  Thus, plea deals end 
investigations and secure convictions.  Confessions bias investigations and almost universally 
secure convictions.   
Experimental Paradigms 
The methods with which to experimentally examine confession and plea behaviors also 
appear similar.  Both plea and confession contexts require a participant-suspect to be accused of 
wrongdoing and urged to cooperate by agreeing to sign a statement.  It is worth nothing that such 
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paradigms would seem to harken back to the days of classic social psychology.  Milgram’s 
(1965) obedience study and the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney et al., 1973) are foundational 
examples of classic social psychology paradigms.  These paradigms create a high-stakes 
situation in which participants become fully engaged and behave in accordance with the ‘reality’ 
of the experiment.  This type of high-deception research has become less prominent in social 
psychology more recently.  But, only this type of deception research can accurately assess 
confession and plea behaviors in an experimental setting.  Confession research has already 
successfully created experimental paradigms that can mimic a high-stakes interrogation scenario.  
It follows that plea-bargaining research can benefit greatly from the experimental paradigms 
created by confession researchers. 
The first of such paradigms is known as the ALT key paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 
1996).  In these studies, participants are asked to complete a task for which the experimenters are 
interested in examining reaction times.  Participants are given a list of letters to enter into the 
computer and are explicitly told not to press the ALT key; doing so would cause the computer to 
crash.  Although none of the participants actually press the forbidden ALT key, the computer 
automatically crashes during the experiment.  All the participants are then accused of having 
ignored the experimenter’s warning and crashing the computer.  In the first of these studies, 69% 
of participants falsely confessed to the accusation of pressing the ALT key and crashing the 
computer (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996).  In another study using this paradigm, 70% of participants 
signed the false confession despite being told that doing so would require them to return to the 
lab for approximately ten hours to reenter data lost in the crash (Redlich & Goodman, 2003). 
 The ALT key paradigm made direct research of false confessions possible.  
Unfortunately, it did not allow a comparison of confession behaviors between the innocent and 
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the guilty.  Another novel paradigm resolved these issues—the cheating paradigm (Russano, 
Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005).  This was the first paradigm to create a situation in which 
participants could be randomly assigned to guilt or innocence.  Participants are recruited for a 
study examining team versus individual problem solving.  Upon arriving to the lab, all 
participants are paired with a confederate who poses as another participant.  As part of the study, 
participants are told to complete individual and team logic problems.  Confederates ask 
participants randomly assigned to be guilty for help on an individual problem (in direct 
contradiction to the experimenter’s instructions).  Innocent participants are not asked for help on 
any of the individual problems.  All participants (regardless of condition) are later accused of 
cheating on the individual problem by the experimenter.  In the first study to use this paradigm, 
confession rates in the conditions not using coercive interrogation techniques were 6% for the 
innocent and 42% for the guilty (Russano et al., 2005).     
 These experimental paradigms have helped to illuminate the processes underlying 
confession behaviors and have allowed researchers to measure the impact of certain variables on 
confession outcomes.  The contexts that these paradigms have mimicked are extremely similar to 
plea bargain contexts.  Thus, this line of research can greatly inform plea-bargaining research 
and has already started to do so.   
Plea and Confession Differences 
 Pleas and confessions share a number of characteristics, but they have their differences as 
well.  Pleas are a type of conviction and confessions are a type of evidence.  Although 
confessions are considered damning evidence, confessors have still not been convicted—they 
can still demand trials thereby requiring the State to continue their discovery for further 
evidence.  Consequently, the decision to plea is very different from the decision to confess.  
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Prosecutors are legally required to outline the consequences of accepting a plea to suspects.  
Investigators are not legally permitted to outline the consequences of confessing (or not 
confessing) to suspects.  Thus, it has been argued that accepting a plea, even when innocent, can 
represent a rational decision (Bibas, 2004).  Confessions, on the other hand, can rarely be 
considered rational because no explicit benefits can be guaranteed.  Due to these differences, it 
seems plausible that certain individual difference variables could have a distinct impact on plea 
versus confession behaviors.  Also, confessions must be predicated on some form of admission.  
Pleas, on the other hand, do not constitutionally require any admission of guilt.     
Plea Components 
Interestingly, although documented cases of the innocent accepting a plea are rare, 
documented cases of people accepting a plea without admitting guilt are not at all rare.  The 
Supreme Court has legitimized two types of plea deals that can be entered and accepted by the 
State without a confession.  Thus, pleas, unlike confessions, do not require any explicit 
admission of guilt.  
A nolo contendere plea or a plea of no contest allows the defendant to refuse entering any 
explicit plea of guilt or innocence (Hudson v. United States, 1926).  According to the Court, plea 
bargains are typically predicated on a guilty plea, but a guilty plea is not a constitutionally 
required component of plea deals.  This decision opened the door to another ruling, which allows 
defendants to accept a plea deal while maintaining their innocence.  In North Carolina v. Alford 
(1970), the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that accepting a plea deal could potentially be in the 
best interests of even an innocent person; thus, the innocent should not be required to lie in order 
to accept a plea deal.  Interestingly, when courts are determining whether to accept a plea deal, 
they are supposed to judge whether sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant’s guilty 
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conviction (Eisen & Rooney, 2002).  In standard plea agreements, defendants enter a guilty plea 
that can serve as sufficient evidence of their guilt.  Alford and nolo contendere pleas include no 
guilt admission, which means that they should require a higher criterion for evidence.  This is a 
legally-accepted supposition—Alford and nolo contendere pleas do require a higher benchmark 
for evidence than standard guilty pleas.  Unfortunately, the depth of this analysis is unclear—
there are no standards regarding the type of evidence that can be considered or should be 
excluded; nor are there standards describing the process by which this assessment should be 
made (Schneider, 2013).  Returning to the case of Kerry Max Cook, it took the court less than 
ten minutes to decide that sufficient evidence existed to accept his nolo contendere plea and 
convict him of Capital Murder.  Despite the ambiguity regarding how these types of pleas should 
be evaluated, 47 states and the District of Columbia accept Alford pleas and 38 states and the 
District of Columbia accept nolo contendere pleas (Redlich & Ozdogru, 2009; Schneider, 2013).  
Decision Outcome Structures 
Plea deals represent a choice between a known outcome and a probabilistic outcome.  In 
contrast, the decision to confess involves no explicitly-known outcomes.  Plea deals are 
predicated on an explicit guarantee of less severe sentences or charges than would otherwise be 
faced at trial.  Confessions, on the other hand, can never legally result from any explicit promise 
of less severe sentences or charges.  Suspects confronted with the decision to confess cannot be 
assured that confessing will reap any benefit; nor can they be assured that not confessing will 
produce any cost.  This ambiguity in decision outcomes renders confession decisions 
incompatible to classic decision-making models that have explicit probabilities and specified 
outcome values.  This is not to say that confessions are never rational or that certain decision-
making biases cannot be meaningfully applied to confession decisions.  But rather, systematic 
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decision preferences (such as those delineated by decision-making models) cannot be easily 
translated to decisions for which the outcomes are entirely unknown.  In other words, if neither 
option is absolutely more risky than the other, risk preferences cannot be determined.  In 
contrast, pleas involve a choice between two explicitly articulated outcomes—Option A: certain 
negative punishment; or, Option B: uncertain negative punishment that is worse than Option A.  
Consequently, pleas can be more meaningfully examined through the lens of decision-making 
models than confessions can.   
Prospect theory, for instance, emphasizes the importance of a reference point (Kahneman, 
2011).  The potential value of an outcome must be measured against this reference point—
whether the ultimate outcome will be a gain or a loss.  Under the assumption of the Supreme 
Court, plea offers should be considered a gain, at least by the guilty.  The reference point for the 
guilty should be conviction and punishment.  Thus, guilty individuals should see the offers made 
during plea negotiations as potential gains to their otherwise more severe punishment.  In 
accordance with prospect theory, individuals faced with a highly probable gain should be risk 
averse (Kahneman, 2011):  
A) A certain gain of $900, or  
B) A 90% chance of gaining $1,000 and a 10% chance of gaining nothing 
 
Thus, people faced with this choice typically choose option A.  In the context of pleas, the risk 
averse choice would seem to correspond to accepting a plea deal (i.e., the certain outcome) over 
the risk of going to trial.  This conclusion, if true, could help to explain the high rate of plea 
acceptance. 
  Innocent individuals on the other hand, should possess a different reference point.  
Because of their innocence, they should perceive any punishment as an undeserved loss.  
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Prospect theory would then predict that their preference would be risk seeking (i.e., prefer 
probabilistic loss over certain loss).  Thus, reframing the previous example:   
A) A certain loss of $900, or  
B) A 90% chance of losing $1,000 and a 10% chance of losing nothing 
 
Presented this choice, people will typically opt for option B.  In other words, innocent people 
facing potential losses should choose to reject plea offers and risk the greater loss at trial.  Thus, 
under these framing assumptions, prospect theory generally seems to lend support to the efficacy 
of plea bargaining practices.  Decision-making biases should favor plea acceptance for the guilty 
and plea rejection for the innocent.  However, these predictions are based on patterns of 
preferences and biases.  Patterns have limits.  According to prospect theory, there is a point at 
which probabilistic losses become so large that a risk seeking preference can be overcome.  
Increasing the cost of risk reduces the number of people who choose to be risk seeking:  
A) A certain loss of $900, or  
B) A 90% chance of losing $9,000 and a 10% chance of losing nothing 
 
In this example, people would most likely opt for the certainty of A rather than risk much greater 
loss by choosing B.       
The point at which a preference for risk (or aversion to risk) can be overcome varies by 
individual.  Some people have a greater tolerance for loss than others.  Thus, it is unclear at what 
point threats could loom so large that the majority of innocents could ignore their preference for 
risk and opt for the certainty of a plea.  One could imagine an innocent defendant being faced 
with this decision:  
A) Plea and serve 6 months in jail, or  
B) Go to trial and potentially serve 12 months in jail or be acquitted 
 
  
	  
26 
Here it seems likely that the innocent defendant would maintain a risk preference and choose B.  
On the other hand, an innocent defendant could also be faced with this decision (an equally legal 
plea bargain):  
A) Plea and serve 6 months in jail, or  
B) Go to trial and potentially serve 12 years or be acquitted 
 
Now, even within the framework of prospect theory, the outcome becomes much less 
predictable.  Only by examining plea decisions within the framework of prospect theory can the 
average “value” of certainty (or plea deals) across individuals within the legal system be 
estimated.  Once such estimates are calculated, meaningful recommendations regarding the size 
and magnitude of sentencing differentials can be made.  However, it is important to note that this 
value will likely not be a single ‘magic number.’  Different crimes can pose drastically different 
sentences.  Such variability will likely require a range of values or proportions for which plea 
discounts must be offered to be effective.  
 In sum, traditional decision-making models can offer an interesting framework with 
which to examine plea outcomes.  Because of the required parameters inherent in plea 
negotiations, they represent a clear decision between certainty and risk.  In contrast, confessions 
are entirely ambiguous and consequently cannot be easily translated to decision-making models.  
Thus, the choice to confess cannot be systematically applied to decision models because the 
decision weights (or at least the relative weights) are unknown.   
Individual Differences 
 Intelligence. Previous research on confessions has examined a number of individual 
difference variables that could affect one’s willingness to confess.  Higher suggestibility ratings 
and anxiety levels have been found to be predictive of a higher propensity to falsely confess 
(Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).  Lower self-esteem and assertiveness have also been found to 
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correlate with higher false confession rates.  Research has also shown that individuals with lower 
cognitive abilities or less education tend to exhibit higher rates of false confession (Redlich, 
2010a).  
 In contrast, it is widely recognized that accepting a plea deal rather than going to trial, 
even when innocent, can be the more rational decision (North Carolina v. Alford, 1970).  Thus, it 
follows that intelligence should not necessarily be a predictor of plea behaviors.  The current 
study sample was composed entirely of undergraduate students rendering a broad exploration of 
the effects of cognitive abilities on plea or confession decisions impossible.  However, the study 
did include measures to examine post-graduate aspirations and ACT scores.  It is important to 
note that ACT scores are traditionally defined as a measure of achievement, assessing one’s 
readiness for post high-school education.  Thus, ACT scores are not a direct measure of 
cognitive abilities.  But, given the restricted study sample of individuals currently enrolled in 
higher education, ACT scores serve as a good proxy to measure variation in cognitive abilities 
within the sample.  These variables are considered exploratory in nature, but could be 
informative if found to be a significant predictor of one behavior (e.g., confessions) but not the 
other (e.g., pleas).  
  Belief in a Just World. Belief in a just world refers to the propensity for one to feel that 
the world is a fair place in which people get what they deserve and deserve what they get 
(Lerner, 1965).  Belief in a just world has also been characterized as a belief in karma—faith that 
“what goes around comes around.”  High endorsement of belief in a just world has been found to 
correlate with several attitudes and behaviors directed at the subjects of unfortunate events.  For 
instance, individuals who believe the world is just are more likely to engage in victim-blaming or 
victim-derogation; this behavior preserves the belief in justice by asserting that the victims 
  
	  
28 
deserved what happened to them (Dalbert, 2009).  On a more positive note, people who believe 
in a just world are also less likely to exhibit ‘road rage’ or engage in aggressive driving 
behaviors (Nesbit, Blankenship, & Murray, 2012).  Apparently, belief in a just world can buffer 
against retaliatory driving actions by providing assurances that bad drivers will be punished (e.g., 
they will get a ticket, get in an accident). Belief in a just world has also been found to correlate 
with general trust in institutions (e.g., the government, security agencies).   
 In keeping with these trends, it seems logical to believe that high endorsement of belief in 
a just world could impact legal decisions.  In accordance with this hypothesis, Wilford (2012) 
found that high belief in a just world impacted plea decisions among the guilty but not the 
innocent.  Guilty participants with high endorsement of belief in a just world were more likely to 
accept the plea deal than those with low endorsement of belief in a just world.  Wilford (2012) 
posited that the reason for this asymmetric finding is that belief in a just world includes two 
dimensions—positive belief in a just world and negative belief in a just world.  Positive belief in 
a just world reflects the belief that good things happen to good people.  In contrast, negative 
belief in a just world refers to the belief that bad things happen to bad people.  In the Wilford 
(2012) study, all participants were accused of cheating (i.e., something bad happened).  Hence, it 
seems plausible that only negative beliefs in a just world were engaged.  This would explain why 
high belief in a just world only affected plea decisions among the guilty (those who had actually 
done something wrong) and not the innocent. 
 Thus, the current research included a newly-constructed scale designed to measure 
positive and negative just world beliefs.  The scale was factor analyzed to determine whether the 
design succeeded in capturing the two potentially distinct dimensions of belief in a just world.  I 
hypothesized that negative (but not positive) belief in a just world would be a significant 
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predictor of plea outcomes among the guilty but not the innocent.  More specifically, people who 
report high negative belief in a just world would be significantly more likely to accept the plea 
when guilty.  This hypothesis stemmed from the Wilford (2012) result.  I further predicted that 
positive belief in a just world would not be a significant predictor of plea outcomes among the 
guilty or the innocent.  Because all participants are accused of cheating, high endorsement of 
positive belief in a just world among the innocent will be seriously challenged—despite the 
innocents’ good behavior, they will be confronted with a negative outcome.  It is currently 
unclear what effect this direct affront to positive belief in a just world among the innocent could 
have.  In contrast, I hypothesized that negative and positive just world beliefs would not be 
significant predictors of confession behaviors among the guilty or the innocent.  Guilty 
individuals with high negative just world beliefs should be inclined to believe that they deserve 
punishment for their behavior, but confessing does not satisfy this inclination.  Unlike the plea 
situation in which a potentially ‘just’ punishment is clearly delineated, the confession situation 
offers more ambiguous consequences.  Although belief in a just world might not directly predict 
confession behaviors, a related phenomenon has been proposed to explain why the innocent 
confess.     
Phenomenology of innocence. Confession researchers have long posited that one of the 
greatest menaces to the legal decision-making of the innocent is innocence itself (Kassin, 2005).  
Innocent people seem to perceive their innocence as a shield that can protect them—this bias has 
been termed the phenomenology of innocence.  Beliefs in a just world and illusions of 
transparency have both been considered potential contributors to this phenomenology (Kassin 
2005).  The illusion of transparency refers to the notion that people tend to overestimate the 
degree to which their internal states are obvious to outsider observers (Gilovich, Savitsky, & 
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Medvec, 1998).  The proposed mechanism underlying this effect is the intensity of one’s own 
internal state (in this case intense awareness of one’s own innocence) along with the anchoring-
and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  The internal state serves as an anchor 
from which the person makes adjustments when trying to assume the perspective of an outside 
observer.  However, “the ‘adjustment’ that one makes from the ‘anchor’ of one’s own internal 
experience is likely to be insufficient” (pg. 332, Gilovich et al., 1998). Consequently, judgments 
of how easily one’s internal state can be perceived by others tend to be overestimated.  This 
illusion of transparency has clear implications for the plea and confession domains.  The 
phenomenological experience of an innocent person is qualitatively different than the 
phenomenological experience of a guilty person.  The ‘anchors’ or starting points they adjust to 
determine the likelihood that others will detect their guilt or innocence are completely different.  
Thus, innocent individuals should be biased toward believing that the outcome of a legal 
investigation will reveal their innocence.  This bias could lead them to waive their rights or 
submit to investigative procedures that are not in their best interest (e.g., interrogation, search of 
personal property).  Although there is currently no direct measure of the illusion of transparency 
or the phenomenology of innocence, Gilovich and colleagues (1998) did find that the illusion of 
transparency correlated with the Private Self-Consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975).  People who rate high in Private Self-Consciousness tend to focus on their internal states 
and spend a lot of time reflecting on themselves.  Consequently, Private Self-Consciousness 
tends to cause an overvaluation of one’s internal state (the anchor), which could result in a 
stronger bias among the innocent to assume that their innocence will be apparent to others. 
Related to this idea, research has shown that innocent individuals are generally more 
likely to cooperate with legal officials and accede to their requests.  For instance, one study 
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found that innocent participants waived their Miranda rights significantly more than the guilty 
participants (Kassin & Norwick, 2004).  All participants were accused of stealing $100 and were 
then asked to waive their rights and submit to questioning.  Eighty-one percent of innocent 
participants chose to waive their rights versus 36% of the guilty participants.  In another study, 
innocent participants were also more likely to allow a witness to be shown their picture alone 
(i.e., as a show-up) than guilty participants who preferred that their picture be part of a lineup 
(100% versus 47%, respectively; Kassin, 2005).  This research supports the idea that the 
phenomenology of innocence impacts legal decisions.  The innocent are more willing to make 
decisions that are consistent with the idea that their innocence will prevail.  This phenomenon is 
not limited to the research lab.  Kerry Max Cook also appeared to be subject to this phenomenon.  
Immediately after his arrest he signed a waiver to allow police to search his home without getting 
a warrant (Cook, 2007).  He also allowed police to question him up until his attorneys 
recommended he invoke his right to silence.       
The phenomenology of innocence can also be strengthened by other legal variables.  In 
another study, Perillo and Kassin (2011) examined the effect of an evidence “bluff” on the 
propensity of both innocent and guilty individuals to sign a confession.  This manipulation was 
designed to mimic real-world cases in which investigators lie to suspects during interrogations.  
These lies typically involve the fabrication of potentially exonerating evidence that has yet to be 
tested; a technique aimed at sweating out the guilty and motivating them to cooperate.  For 
instance, an investigator might tell a suspect that DNA was found at the crime scene and that the 
results of the testing could be released at any moment—thus, it is in the best interest of the 
suspect to cooperate immediately.  Interestingly, the results of Perillo and Kassin (2011) showed 
that the evidence-bluff had little effect on the guilty, but led to a large increase in confessions 
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from the innocent.  The evidence-bluff appears to validate and strengthen the phenomenology of 
innocence because the innocent know that the evidence being bluffed will help reveal their 
innocence.  This increased confidence from the evidence-bluff leads the innocent to believe their 
decision to confess will have little or no impact on the outcome of their case.   
The current research capitalizes on the finding of Perillo and Kassin (2011), which 
showed that an evidence-bluff increases confessions among the innocent.  Specifically, I 
hypothesize that an evidence-bluff would have the opposite effect on pleas among the innocent.  
In other words, instead of the evidence-bluff increasing plea acceptance among the innocent (as 
it does with confessions), evidence-bluffs should decrease pleas among the innocent.  The key 
difference between pleas and confessions concerns the fate of the bluffed evidence.  If one signs 
a confession, the legal process continues and the evidence that could prove one’s innocence is 
preserved and analyzed.  If one signs a plea, in contrast, the legal process is terminated, and there 
is no attempt to preserve or analyze evidence that could prove one’s innocence—instead, the plea 
assures conviction.  Hence, an evidence-bluff should reduce the innocent’s resistance to 
confessing, but increase their resistance to accept pleas.     
 The Plea Bargaining Literature 
Legal Discussion and Statistics 
In 2004, approximately 1,024,947 people accepted a plea deal and were consequently 
convicted of felonies—this number represents 95% of the total felony convictions in America 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007).  Ninety-seven percent of 2008 U.S. district court convictions 
were attained via plea negotiations (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).  Although pleas have 
always been a dominant force in our justice system, these numbers represent a growing trend.  
The proportion of convictions resulting from pleas has risen 3% from 2005 to 2009; this trend is 
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complemented by a decrease in the number of cases tried by a judge or jury from 3,930 in 2005 
to 3,140 in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).  Since the 1980s, plea convictions have 
been on the rise (Oppel, 2011).  For decades, plea convictions represented approximately 80% of 
total criminal convictions; now, reports predominantly cite the proportion of plea convictions at 
95% or higher.  
Many legal scholars have questioned whether plea-bargaining is inherently coercive.  
These questions have gained further traction with the continued increases in plea convictions.  
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that pleas cannot be coercive so long as the defendant has 
the right or freedom to reject the plea, some attorneys have questioned the value of that freedom.  
When threats for rejecting a plea deal are unrestrained and can loom so large, is the freedom to 
reject really a form of protection (Gazal-Ayal, 2006; Covey, 2008)?  Further, it is difficult to 
assess the impact of these threats on the advice of defense attorneys—advice that can greatly 
impact final plea outcomes (Winick, 1999).  Legal reviews have even made reference to theories 
of rational decision-making arguing that prosecutors have the power to create deals that any 
rational person would choose to accept—even if the rational person is innocent (Bar-Gill & Ben-
Shahar, 2000; Bibas, 2004).   
Survey/Archival Data 
 There is very little plea-bargaining research.  What does exist has been largely limited to 
surveys of previously or currently incarcerated individuals.  One such analysis examined reasons 
for accepting a plea bargain provided by convicted defendants (Bordens & Bassett, 1985).  A 
factor analysis revealed seven primary factors present in defendant’s reasons for accepting a plea 
deal: prosecutorial pressure, sentence-related reasoning, expediency, perceived likelihood of 
conviction, indirect pressure, remorse, and acquiescence/cooperation.  A separate study tested 
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the supposition that plea-bargaining is necessarily coercive, since suspects are often threatened 
with incarceration if they choose to go to trial (Smith, 1986).  This study attempted to estimate 
what the rate of incarceration would have been if those who took a plea had gone to trial instead 
(.45).  This estimate was compared with the proportion of those who were incarcerated despite 
accepting a plea deal (.42).  Because no difference between these proportions was found, the 
author concluded that suspects are not unduly coerced into pleas by the threat of incarceration.  
Unfortunately, the author did not include any information regarding differences in the average 
duration of imprisonment, which greatly weakens his conclusions.  Although no difference in 
incarceration was found, differences in the duration of incarceration are commonly found.  In 
2003, the average federal sentence resulting from a plea deal was about one-third the sentence 
that those convicted at trial typically received (Burke, 2007).  Further, the author failed to 
emphasize the fact that these estimates were constructed between groups.  The sample of people 
who took the plea deal would differ in a number of potentially systematic ways from a sample of 
people who went to trial (e.g., amount of evidence, type of crime).  Thus, for the conclusions of 
this analysis to be at all tenable, numerous variables would need to be controlled (that were not).   
 A later study addressed some of these weaknesses by examining the impact of plea 
decisions on sentence duration rather than incarceration probability (Bushway & Redlich, 2012).  
Based on data from 1,593 plea cases and 305 tried cases, the researchers estimated that those 
who accepted a plea deal served an average of 72.2% of the sentence they would have received 
at trial.  Those who went to trial served a sentence that was 29.6% greater than the plea sentence 
would have been.  
  A sparse amount of research has used surveys to examine individual differences that 
could have an impact on plea bargaining decisions.  In one study of juvenile defendants, 
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researchers measured multiple demographic, criminological, and situational variables including a 
cognitive assessment, psychiatric rating, fitness test, Miranda comprehension measure, etc.  
Analyses explored the relationship of all these measures to plea outcomes—the only consistently 
significant predictor of plea decisions was the perceived strength of the prosecution’s evidence 
(Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005).  Interestingly though, this variable did not predict plea 
decisions among younger defendants (aged 11 – 14).  This study also showed that juvenile 
defendants advised to accept a plea by their parents, attorneys, and peers were more likely to 
report intending to do so.  Defendants who rated lower on measures of cognitive ability were 
significantly more likely to report not wanting to accept a plea bargain.  Adults, on the other 
hand, do not exhibit a relationship between years of education and plea decisions among the 
innocent (Redlich, Summers, & Hoover, 2010).  
One study found that the presence of physical evidence was a strong predictor of plea 
decisions among an adult sample (Albonetti, 1990).  This study also found that race was a 
significant predictor of plea behaviors—black defendants were significantly less likely than 
white defendants to accept a plea deal.  In contrast, another survey found that minorities were 
significantly more likely to accept a plea bargain despite being innocent (Redlich, Summers, & 
Hoover, 2010).  This study also found that defendants who reported severe mental illness 
symptoms were more likely to report accepting a plea bargain despite being innocent.   
 Other studies have examined the rates of charge bargaining—plea offers that involve a 
reduction of charges that can, but do not necessarily, include a sentence reduction.  One such 
study assessed a sample of 2,578 offenders who accepted a plea in 1993 (Ball, 2006).  This study 
found that the type of criminal charge was the most significant predictor of count reductions; 
more severe charges resulted in a higher likelihood of a count reduction.  Another analysis of 
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charge bargaining found that charge reductions could result in a 22.2% sentence reduction (based 
on sentences expected at arraignment, Piehl & Bushway, 2007).  Unfortunately, examinations of 
charge bargaining practices are difficult due to routine overcharging (Piehl & Bushway, 2007).  
Overcharging refers to a common prosecutorial practice in which they threaten defendants with 
as many charges as possible to get plea deals.  What defendants do not know, however, is how 
many of the charges would actually be pursued if the defendant chose to go to trial (in which the 
standard of evidence for each charge is greater).  It is not uncommon for prosecutors to threaten 
charging defendants with two or three crimes when only one would be supported with enough 
evidence to pursue at trial.   
A historical analysis of 4,000 criminal cases occurring in the state of Massachusetts 
attempted to isolate the cause for the rise of plea-bargaining from the mid-1800s to today (Fisher, 
2000).  The author concludes that plea-bargaining’s rise can be largely attributed to the growing 
benefits this system of justice confers on the most powerful legal actors (i.e., prosecutors and 
judges).  “Finally, plea bargaining grew so entrenched in the halls of power that today, though its 
patrons may divide its spoils in different ways, it can grow no more.  For plea bargaining has 
won” (p. 1075, Fisher, 2000). 
Vignette/Scenario-Based Research 
 Some studies have examined plea negotiations experimentally, but these have been 
primarily restricted to vignette methods.  An early and complex vignette study employed a 4 
(punishment: probation, six months in prison, one year in prison, or three years in prison) x 3 
(defense attorney’s estimated likelihood of conviction: 10%, 50%, or 90%) x 2 (plea discount: 
one year or five years) x 2 (role: innocent or guilty) between-participants design to illuminate the 
decision strategy employed by people deciding whether to accept or reject a plea deal (Bordens, 
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1984).  As with all the vignette studies, these conditions corresponded to information provided in 
the vignettes (e.g., one participant could read a vignette in which the potential punishment was 
six months in prison with a conviction probability of 50%).  This study found that innocent 
participants were generally less likely to accept a plea deal than guilty participants (20.3% versus 
79.6%, respectively).  The defense attorney’s estimated likelihood of conviction appeared to 
have the strongest impact on plea outcomes resulting in more rejections (even among the guilty) 
at 10% and more acceptances (even among the innocent) at 90%.    
In another vignette study, participants were asked to imagine being accused of cheating 
on an exam (Avishalom, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010).  Participants were told that their case 
would be presented before an ethics committee.  If convicted, they could be suspended from 
school.  They were also provided the option of contesting the accusation, which would result in 
their failure of the class but save them the possibility of suspension.  Some of the participants 
were told that they were actually innocent whereas others were told they were guilty.  The plea 
acceptance rate among the guilty was 67% versus 20% among the innocent—this difference was 
found despite the equivalent probability of conviction (60%) and exoneration (40%) presented to 
all participants.  In a follow-up study, the researchers examined the effects of perceived fairness 
on plea decisions.  Participants were provided with the same vignette but were told that the plea 
deal they were being offered was better, similar to, or worse than those typically offered.  They 
found that perceived fairness affected the willingness of both innocent and guilty people to 
accept a plea.     
 Another vignette study used a 2 (sentence severity: two years or five years) x 3 
(conviction probability: 20%, 50% or 80%) between-participants design (McAllister & Bregman, 
1986). Participants were asked to report whether or not they would accept a plea deal for a one-
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year sentence under these manipulated conditions.  This experiment found that participants’ 
decisions were fairly rational as plea rates increased with both sentence severity and conviction 
probability.  A second experiment used the same design but asked participants to take the role of 
the defense attorney rather than defendant.  In this experiment, participants’ decisions were still 
affected by the probability of conviction but were unaffected by sentence severity.   
 Another study recruited a sample of only defense attorneys (Kramer, Wolbransky, & 
Heilbrun, 2007) to assess how they would advise clients given certain vignettes.  This study also 
found that the probability of conviction (based on the strength of the evidence) impacted 
attorneys’ decisions to recommend a plea to their clients.  In contrast to the previous study, this 
study found that the potential sentence at conviction did affect how attorneys would advise their 
clients.  Interestingly, defendants’ wishes did not have a strong impact on the way attorneys 
would advise them except in cases for which they disagreed (e.g., if the defendant did not want 
to plea despite there being strong evidence against him).  Another study examined potential 
racial disparities in plea-bargaining practices among defense attorneys finding that when a 
hypothetical defendant was black, he was more than three times more likely to be encouraged to 
accept a plea deal than when he was white (Edkins, 2011). 
A more recent study provided one of four potential vignettes to both defense and 
prosecuting attorneys in the state of California (Pezdek & O’Brien, 2014)—the vignettes differed 
in whether the eyewitness identification was the same- or cross-race and whether the eyewitness 
and suspect were familiar with one another.  The results showed that each factor seemed to 
impact defense and prosecuting attorneys in complementary ways (e.g., prior familiarity with the 
eyewitness made prosecutors less likely to offer a plea unless the sentence was still severe, and 
defense attorneys more likely to advise clients to accept a plea even if the sentence was severe).  
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These experimental factors however, exhibited a stronger impact on defense attorneys than 
prosecuting attorneys.  Prosecuting attorneys reported propensities toward plea-bargaining that 
were near ceiling, which made it difficult to significantly impact their decisions.  Essentially, 
prosecutors appeared to exhibit more confidence in the control they had over the outcome of the 
case regardless of the evidence. 
Experimental Research 
 Only three studies have examined plea-bargaining behaviors with an experimental 
paradigm that actually involves an accusation of wrongdoing.  In the first of these studies 
participants were asked to take a difficult exam that was designed to evaluate certain teaching 
strategies and instructors in the department (Gregory, Mowen, & Liner, 1978).  Participants were 
motivated to do well by the promise of an extra course research credit for superior performance.  
Prior to taking the test, half of the participants were given false information about the exam by a 
confederate—the confederate claimed to possess prior knowledge of the test and knew that most 
of the correct answers were ‘B’.  Innocent participants were not told anything about the test.  All 
participants were then accused of cheating on the exam due to their surprisingly high 
performance—they were told that they had exceeded the top score by five (on a 30-question 
test).  The experimenter then told participants that they would have to present their case to an 
ethics committee.  If the committee found the participant innocent, he would be awarded the 
extra credit for superior test performance.  If he was found guilty however, he would lose a 
research credit and be deducted a letter grade in his class.  Participants were then offered a plea 
deal—if they admitted to having cheated and agreed to receive no credit for the study, the 
accusation would be dropped.  In this study, zero of eight innocent participants accepted the plea 
deal versus six of eight guilty participants.        
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 Another study used a modified confession paradigm to examine plea behaviors (Dervan 
& Edkins, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2013).  The study used a method known as the cheating 
paradigm, which will be discussed in further detail later (Russano et al., 2005)2.  Participants 
were accused of cheating during the research study and told that they would face punishment if 
found guilty.  Some participants were told the punishment would be a semester-long ethics 
course while others were told the punishment would include a three-week long ethics course.  
Participants were also offered a plea deal, which would result in them receiving no credit for 
their study participation.  Overall, 89.2% of guilty participants accepted the plea offer versus 
56.4% of the innocent.  When broken down by condition, guilty participants given the harsher 
punishment accepted the plea deal at a rate of 94.1% and innocents accepted the plea at a rate of 
61.1% versus 85.0% and 52.4% in the more lenient conditions, respectively.   
 My Master’s degree thesis was the only other study to experimentally examine plea-
bargaining behaviors in an ecologically valid context (Wilford, 2012).  Using a modified 
cheating paradigm, Wilford (2012) examined the rates of plea acceptance for the innocent and 
the guilty (Russano et al., 2005).  All participants were recruited for a study examining team 
versus individual problem solving.  Upon arriving to the lab, participants were paired with a 
confederate who acted as a second participant.  As part of the study, participants were asked to 
complete individual and team logic problems.  The confederate requested help on an individual 
problem from participants randomly assigned to be guilty (in direct contradiction to the 
experimenter’s instructions).  Innocent participants were not asked to cheat.  All participants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On its face, this study appears identical to Wilford (2012).  Unfortunately, the researchers altered their study in 
ways that reduce the ecological validity of their results.  For instance, participants were required to admit guilt as 
part of accepting the plea deal (as in Gregory et al., 1978).  This requirement is problematic because Alford and nolo 
contendere pleas do not require a guilt admission and are accepted in most jurisdictions (Redlich & Ozdogru, 2009).  
Additionally, all participants were told that the probability of conviction was very high (i.e., like 80 – 90%), which 
limits the generalizability of these results to many individual cases.  They also told participants that they were found 
to have had the same wrong answer on two individual questions (not just one).  This change created a situation in 
which even guilty participants were partially innocent of the offense for which they were being accused.   
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were later accused of cheating on the individual problem.  After the accusation, participants were 
told that the professor was willing to drop the cheating accusation if the participant agreed to 
work in the research lab 20 hours over the next month.  If they rejected the deal, they would be 
charged with academic dishonesty through the Dean of Students Office, and if found guilty they 
would receive a failing mark in their course and be put on indefinite academic probation.  In this 
exploratory study, 79% of the guilty accepted the plea, which was significantly greater than the 
proportion of the innocent who accepted the plea.  However, the rate of plea acceptance among 
the innocent was still alarmingly high at 52%.   
The Current Research 
 The current research was designed to examine potential differences between confession 
and plea behaviors.  The study employed an adapted version of the cheating paradigm to 
manipulate guilt and innocence (Russano et al., 2005).  After participants were accused of 
cheating, they were asked either to sign a confession or accept a plea deal.  To my knowledge, 
this was the first experiment to examine both plea and confession behaviors.  Some participants 
were then presented with an evidence-bluff whereas others received no bluff.  This evidence-
bluff manipulation could reveal whether the phenomenology of innocence impacts confession 
and plea decisions differently (Perillo & Kassin, 2011).  
 The evidence-bluff manipulation involved telling participants that a hidden camera could 
definitively reveal whether they cheated or did not cheat.  However, the video from the camera 
was not immediately accessible; thus, the experimenter had to move forward with the cheating 
accusation process.  I predicted that although the evidence-bluff would increase false confessions 
(replicating Perillo & Kassin, 2011), it would actually decrease false pleas.  Upon receiving an 
evidence-bluff, innocent individuals’ resistance to confess decreases, because the bluff provides 
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them with reassurance that the confession poses no threat (i.e., the evidence-bluff strengthens the 
phenomenology of innocence)—the bluff-evidence will be preserved and analyzed proving them 
innocent later despite their confession.  The strengthening of the phenomenology of innocence 
(via the evidence-bluff) should cause a different outcome in the context of a plea.  Innocent 
individuals should be more resistant to falsely pleading upon receiving an evidence-bluff, 
because the bluff provides them with reassurance that their innocence will be discovered once 
the bluff-evidence is preserved and analyzed.  If they accepted the plea however, the process 
would be terminated and the bluff-evidence would not be preserved and analyzed, robbing them 
of their opportunity to be proven innocent.  The innocent should therefore be motivated to 
preserve the opportunity for their innocence to be discovered, and consequently reject the plea to 
keep the legal process moving forward.  If data from the current research supports this 
hypothesis, it will further substantiate the contention that further research on plea bargaining is 
warranted.   
This study also examined whether certain individual differences would moderate the rate 
of plea acceptance.  The current research further examined the surprisingly asymmetric effect of 
just world beliefs on plea behaviors found in previous research (Wilford, 2012).  I explored the 
reliability of a new belief in a just world measure separating the construct into two dimensions—
positive belief in a just world and negative belief in a just world.  I predicted that these two 
measures (if both emerged in a factor analysis) would show distinct predictive relationships with 
plea behaviors as opposed to confession behaviors. 
 Participants were recruited for a study that claimed to be examining individual versus 
team problem solving.  Upon arrival, they were paired with a confederate posing as another 
participant.  During the problem-solving phase of the study, guilty participants were asked to 
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provide their answer to an individual problem by the confederate.  Participants in the innocent 
conditions were not asked for their answers to the individual problems.  All participants were 
later accused of cheating on the individual problems.  Experimenters were kept blind throughout 
the session as to who had and who had not actually cheated. 
 During the accusation phase of the study, participants in the evidence-bluff conditions 
were told that a hidden camera recorded the entire session, and could reveal whether they 
actually cheated.  Participants in the no-bluff conditions were not told about a camera.  All 
participants were told that the case could be handed to the Department of Psychology’s Human 
Research Ethics Review, which is responsible for handling cheating when it occurs in research 
studies.  They were then told that if this review found them guilty of cheating, they would lose 
all their research credits and future research privileges and could be put on indefinite academic 
probation.  After the accusation, participants in the plea conditions were offered a plea deal—
they could agree to work in the lab 20 hours over the next month and the accusation would be 
dropped.  Participants in the confession conditions were asked to sign a written admission of 
guilt.  In sum, this research examined the differences between confession and plea behaviors 
among the innocent and the guilty in a modified cheating paradigm.  It also included individual 
difference variables to determine whether confession and plea behaviors are moderated 
differently by certain traits or characteristics.      
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CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
Participants 
 Four hundred and twenty-two undergraduate students enrolled in introductory courses at 
Iowa State University participated in this experiment in exchange for two course research credits. 
All participants were treated in accordance with the American Psychological Association (APA) 
ethical guidelines. 
Design 
This study employed a 2 (innocent or guilty) x 2 (confession or plea) x 2 (evidence-bluff 
or no-bluff) between-participants design.  Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
eight potential conditions. 
Materials  
 Global Belief in a Just World Scale.  The Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS) is 
a seven-item questionnaire designed to measure people’s general belief in a just world (refer to 
Appendix A; Lipkus, 1991).  The scale includes seven statements for which participants are 
asked to respond with the number that corresponds to their level of agreement or disagreement 
with each statement.  All the items are presented with a six-point, Likert-type scale that ranges 
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).  Higher scores indicate stronger belief in a just 
world.  The GBJWS has been tested against both the Just World Scale and the Just World Scale 
Revised—it achieved higher reliability scores than both (Hellman, Muilenburg-Trevino, & 
Worley, 2008).  Despite disagreements concerning the construct validity of just world measures 
in general (Furnham, 2003; Whatley, 1993), it is assumed that the GBJWS will provide the best 
measure for the present study.  GBJWS is the best available measure of general belief in a just 
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world—not personal belief in a just world (Dalbert, 2009)3.  Global belief in a just world has 
been found to be the most predictive belief in a just world measure of behaviors in situations that 
pose risks controlled by others, which would make it more relevant to legal situations. 
 Rosenberg Self-Esteem.  The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale is an eight-item questionnaire 
designed to measure people’s personal beliefs about themselves (refer to Appendix B; 
Rosenberg, 1965).  The scale includes ten statements for which participants are asked to provide 
the number corresponding to their level of agreement or disagreement.  Each statement is 
measured with a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  Half 
of the items are reverse scored and higher total scores correspond to higher self-esteem.  
Numerous studies have used this scale and it consistently achieves high reliability, Cronbach’s α 
> .8 (Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Russell, 2000; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & 
Bushman, 2004).   
 Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World. The Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World 
(PNBJW) scale is a 12-item questionnaire I constructed to measure people’s positive and 
negative beliefs about fairness (refer to Appendix C).  The scale includes 12 statements for 
which participants are asked to write the number expressing their level of disagreement or 
agreement.  Each statement is presented with a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).  Half of the items were designed to be reverse coded and higher 
total scores indicate higher endorsement of belief in a just world (either positive or negative).  
The unique component of this scale is that it can be broken up into two subscales.  One subscale 
measures people’s endorsement of negative belief in a just world, which is that bad things 
happen to bad people.  The other subscale measures people’s endorsement of positive belief in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Personal or self-belief in a just world refers to the belief that the world is just for the individual self whereas global 
or general belief in a just world refers to the belief that the world is fair for everyone (Bégue & Bastounis, 2003).  
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just world; how much they believe that good things happen to good people.  Essentially, this 
scale attempts to examine whether people endorse the idea of punishment or reward differently 
when determining whether the world is just.     
Private Self-Consciousness Scale.  The Private Self-Consciousness Scale measures 
individual differences in self-consciousness; specifically, the attention one pays to inner (private) 
thoughts and feelings (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; refer to Appendix D).  The measure 
includes ten items for which participants are asked to indicate the level at which the statement 
describes them.  Each item is rated on a 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely 
characteristic) Likert scale.  Private self-consciousness has been shown to be distinguishable 
from a more public self-consciousness construct, which focuses more on the self as a social 
being (Fenigstein, 1987).  This scale has also been shown to produce strong test-retest 
correlations (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  A discriminant validity analysis demonstrated that the 
Private Self-Consciousness Scale does not reliably correlate with need for achievement, IQ, 
Temperament (i.e., Emotionality, Activity Level, Sociability, and Impulsivity), or test anxiety 
(Carver & Glass, 1976).       
Demographic Information.  Demographic measures were primarily included to provide a 
description of the study sample (refer to Appendix E).  Additionally, demographic items served 
as possible independent variables with which to compare other dependent measures.  For 
instance, men are often found to endorse higher just world beliefs than women (Whatley, 2003); 
thus, including a gender variable allowed me to examine whether this trend was preserved with 
the new PNBJW measure.  
Political endorsements were measured with two items.  Each item included its own 
seven-point Likert-type scale.  The first question asked participants to rate their party 
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identification from 1 (Strong Republican) to 7 (Strong Democrat)—“Generally speaking, do you 
usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?”  A “neutral” 
response of 4 indicated a preference of Independent.  The second item asked participants to rate 
themselves on a political ideology spectrum, “Which of these opinions best represents your 
views?”.  This scale ranged from 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 7 (Extremely Conservative) with a 
neutral response of 4 to indicate “Moderate/Middle of the Road”. 
Education-related items included four questions.  The first question asked participants to 
report an estimate of their composite ACT score.  The second question asked participants to 
provide a rating of their score relative to others (e.g., higher than average).  One open-ended 
question requested participants to write-in their major.  A final, two-part question asked 
participants to indicate whether they intend on going to graduate school.  If they answered, 
“Yes”, they were asked to indicate what type of degree they planned to pursue: Masters, Ph.D., 
J.D. M.D. (or other medical degree), or Other (write-in).  
Big Five-Aspect Scale.  The five-factor model of personality has been validated in years 
of research (refer to Appendix F; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008; McCrae & Costa, 1987; 
McCrae & Costa, 1997).  The model essentially posits that all individual personality traits derive 
from five overarching factors.  The five factors of personality are typically labeled as: 
neuroticism, agreeableness, openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness.  Recently, the five-
factor model has been broadened to include an aspect-level of personality in which each factor 
includes two more specific and distinguishable aspects (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007).  
For instance, neuroticism has been found to include aspects of both volatility and withdraw; 
these aspects are not entirely orthogonal to each other but are not entirely related either.  Thus, 
some individuals could score as mildly neurotic on a Big Five measure because they are very 
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withdrawn but not volatile or vice versa.  Only by measuring traits at the aspect level, can we 
determine the specific characteristics that might be driving certain responses.  
 The Big Five Aspect Scale is designed to measure the ten aspects found to be subsumed 
in the five factors: volatility and withdraw (neuroticism), politeness and compassion 
(agreeableness), orderliness and industriousness (conscientiousness), enthusiasm and 
assertiveness (extraversion), and openness and intelligence (openness; refer to Appendix E).  The 
scale includes 100 statements accompanied with Likert-type scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 
7 (Strongly agree).  Participants are asked to respond with the number that corresponds to their 
level of agreement or disagreement with each statement.  The Big Five Aspect Scale was 
primarily included to determine whether the new Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World scale 
correlated significantly with theoretically-relevant personality traits.  For instance, individuals 
with high Negative Belief in a Just World should believe that victims of misfortune deserve that 
misfortune; thus, Negative Belief in a Just World should theoretically correlate negatively with 
the compassion aspect of agreeableness.  Completion of the scale also served as a good distractor 
task between the problem-solving and accusation phases of the study.    
Procedure 
 This procedure has been further adapted from the cheating paradigm, which was first 
introduced by Russano et al. (2005).  All participants were recruited via the online research 
participation system, SONA.  The study posting informed participants of the study title, 
“Problem Solving with Personality,” and that the researchers were interested in examining how 
people solve problems individually and with a partner.   
 Upon arriving at the research lab, participants were paired with a confederate who posed 
as another participant.  The experimenter requested informed consent from both the participant 
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and the confederate.  During the consent process, the experimenter reminded participants of the 
study criteria—all participants had to be 18 years of age or older and be native English speakers.  
Participants were then taken to a room with the confederate and asked to fill out the first 
questionnaire.  The first questionnaire included the belief in a just world measures, the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the Private Self-Consciousness Scale, and the demographic 
questions (Appendices A-E).  The experimenter left the room while the participant and 
confederate filled out the first questionnaire.  Once the questionnaire was completed, the 
participant or confederate opened the door to the room (in accordance with the experimenter’s 
instructions) signaling to the experimenter that they were ready for the next phase of the study. 
 The experimenter returned to the room with two blank nametags.  He or she explained to 
participants that people who are asked to solve problems together are typically not total 
strangers; they are often peers, co-workers, or collaborators.  Thus, in keeping with the study’s 
cover story, participants were asked to engage in a rapport-building session with the 
confederates.  Once the participant and confederate put on their nametags, the experimenter left 
the room for three minutes. 
 The experimenter later returned with three logic problems packets—two individual 
problems packets and one team problems packet (refer to Appendices G and H, respectively).  
Each packet contained two open-ended problems.  The packets were placed with an individual 
packet in front of both the participant and confederate, and the team packet in between.  The 
experimenter then provided explicit instructions that the individual problems were to be solved 
alone and the team problems were to be solved together.  The experimenter also requested that 
the problems be solved in an alternating pattern such that every other problem was an individual 
problem then a team problem.  After the experimenter finished the instructions and assured that 
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there were no questions, the participant and confederate were left alone again.  Participants 
assigned to the guilty condition were induced to cheat on the second individual problem—
hereafter referred to as the triangle problem.  Confederates said they were experiencing difficulty 
with the problem and asked the participants what answer they wrote down.  Participants who 
refused to provide their answer were asked up to two more times (never exceeding three total 
requests).  Participants in the innocent conditions were never asked for help on individual 
problems.  After the problems were completed, the confederate or participant once again opened 
the door to the room to inform the experimenter.   
 Upon returning, the experimenter collected the logic problems packets and explicitly 
stated that he or she would move on to scoring the problems.  In the mean time, the experimenter 
requested that the participant and confederate fill out a personality questionnaire (Big Five 
Aspects Scale; refer to Appendix F).  After the questionnaires were completed, the experimenter 
returned looking distracted, with the logic problems in hand.  The experimenter stated that he or 
she needed to go check on something, and then closed the door to the room with the participant 
and confederate.  Two minutes later the experimenter returned stating that there was a problem 
and requested to speak to the participant and confederate separately.  The experimenter first 
asked the confederate to come to another room.  Three minutes later the experimenter walked the 
confederate back and led the participant to another room. 
 After asking the participant to sit down, the experimenter explained that an issue arose 
during the scoring of the logic problems.  The issue was that the participant and the confederate 
had the same wrong answer on the triangle problem—an extremely statistically unlikely event.  
The experimenter went on to say that he or she was unsure how to handle the situation and 
decided to contact the professor in charge of the study.  The experimenter explained that the 
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professor sounded pretty upset and thinks the case might have to be turned over to the 
Department of Psychology Human Research Ethics Review—a committee set up to handle 
cheating when it occurs in research studies.  The experimenter then recited one of four possible 
statements depending on the condition to which the participant was randomly assigned.   
In evidence-bluff conditions, participants were told that potentially exonerating or 
damning evidence exists: 
My professor reminded me that there is a hidden camera set up in the other 
room that recorded the whole session.  It could reveal whether you cheated or 
didn’t cheat.  The video is automated and only exists for security reasons.  
Because, I guess the lab had a break-in last year or something.  Unfortunately, the 
camera feeds directly into a locked server that records video, but is limited to a 
24-hour loop due to data storage limitations.  This server is only accessible by an 
off-campus security firm… 
 
This script was adapted from a confession experiment, Perillo and Kassin (2011)—the first study 
to include an evidence-bluff manipulation.   
Importantly, the evidence-bluff manipulation was slightly altered between confession and 
plea conditions.  To mimic real-world procedures, participants in the confession conditions were 
told that the professor was in the process of contacting the security firm at that time.  They were 
told that regardless of what they decided, the professor would save the video in order to turn it 
over to the Human Research Ethics Review.  Participants in the plea conditions were told that if 
they chose to accept the plea, the professor would not go to the trouble of saving the video.  By 
accepting the plea, they were essentially ending the matter and signaling that no further 
investigation was necessary.  Participants were told that if the professor did not save the video, it 
would be erased within 24 hours (because the server records on a continuous loop that is limited 
to a 24 hour cycle).  This difference accurately mimics real-life situations in which a confession 
does not end an investigation.  After securing a confession, investigators have to continue 
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pursuing evidence to try the suspect.  When a plea is accepted however, the investigation is over 
and no other evidence will be gathered or evaluated.   
Experimenters provided the participants with one of two handwritten statements to sign.  
In the confession conditions, participants were presented with this statement: 
I admit to having shared answers on the individual triangle problem in the 
Problem-Solving with Personality study. 
 
In the plea conditions, participants were instead presented with this statement: 
 I agree to work 20 hours on the Problem Solving with Personality study 
by (write in month after date). 
 
If participants did not initially sign the statement, the experimenter requested that they sign up to 
two more times (three total times).  After participants had refused or signed, the experimenter 
left again stating that the professor had to be updated.  Two minutes later, the experimenter 
returned with a final questionnaire to measure the participant’s impressions of the confederate 
(refer to Appendix I).  At that point the experimenter exited again to let the participant complete 
the questionnaire.  When the experimenter returned and the participant had completed the 
questionnaire, the experimenter requested that the participant answer a few more questions about 
the cheating accusation.  They were told that the professor requested the participant answer each 
question so that he could be totally informed regarding the situation (Post-Accusation Measures; 
refer to Appendix J).  The experimenter then completed a funnel debriefing in which the 
participants were gaged for suspicion while the true purposes of the study were slowly revealed.    
 During the debriefing process, participants were asked whether they had any questions 
about the study and what they believed the study was examining.  As part of the debriefing, 
participants were told that the research was actually investigating plea and confession behaviors.  
They were then told that the confederate was part of the research team and was instructed to ask 
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some of them for help on one of the individual problems.  They were assured that most people 
cooperate with this request and in this context complying with the request should be perceived as 
helping rather than cheating.  They were also asked to verbally agree to not share the true 
purpose of the experiment with anyone; the experimenter then recorded their verbal response to 
that request.  When the debriefing process was complete and all of the participants’ questions 
had been answered, the experimenter left the participant with a blank informed consent and an 
informational sheet on the free counseling services offered on campus (refer to Appendix K).  
The experimenter stated that the participant was free to take either of the forms with them, or 
leave them behind to be reused.  On their way out of the lab, participants were asked a second 
time to not talk about the study with other people.       
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS  
 Four hundred and twenty-two undergraduate students participated in the current study in 
exchange for course research credit.  Two hundred and thirty-three of the participants were 
female (54.3%) and 189 were male (44.1%).  The mean age was 19.3 years with a range of 18 to 
51 years of age.  Data from 94 of the 422 participants (22.2%) had to be excluded from all data 
analyses.  Participants’ data were most commonly excluded due to suspicion.  The exclusion 
criteria for suspicion were: 1) participants who reported that the confederate-participant was in 
on the study and/or, 2) participants who stated the study’s true purpose was to examine whether 
people would be willing to sign a statement following an accusation.  46 participants (10.9%) 
met one or both of these criteria—a proportion that has increased significantly from previous 
plea studies; unfortunately, the increasing exposure of undergraduate students to the cheating 
paradigm is causing higher levels of suspicion in the participant pool.  Data from another 20 
participants (4.7%) were excluded due to early suspension of the study session; study sessions 
were suspended primarily due to observable emotional distress.  Ten participants’ (2.4%) data 
were excluded because their behaviors did not comport to their randomly assigned conditions—
guilty people who refused to cheat and innocent people who cheated (e.g., who were seen by the 
confederate peeking at the confederate’s responses).  Data from eight participants (1.9%) were 
excluded because they made statements that were inconsistent with the study parameters or 
instructions.  For instance, some participants falsely reported that the bluff-video (filmed during 
the problem-solving phase of the study) would be watched despite their acceptance of the plea 
deal.  Data from another eight participants (1.9%) were excluded after participants admitted that 
they had prior knowledge of the study protocol. Finally, two participants’ data were excluded 
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because the participant did not fulfill the requirements of study participation and due to 
experimenter error. 
 All inferential analyses used an alpha level of .05.  When appropriate, effect sizes and 
confidence intervals around those effect sizes are reported.  The effect size metric r was used.  
Cohen (1977) considers small, medium, and large effect sizes for r to be .10, .30, and .50, 
respectively.  Data examining the impact of the manipulated independent variables on 
acceptance outcomes will be presented first.  Second, a quantitative analysis of the qualitative 
data produced by participants explaining why they refused or agreed to sign the statement.  That 
analysis will be followed by ANOVAs examining the impact of the experimental variables on 
(continuous) post-accusation measures.  Analyses will also be presented assessing the reliability 
and validity of the new Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World measure.  Finally, data for the 
belief in a just world measures as moderators of acceptance outcomes will be presented.   
Acceptance Outcomes 
The leading purpose of this research was to determine whether the manipulated variables 
would have a differential impact on plea versus confession decisions among the guilty and the 
innocent. First, as expected, innocent participants were significantly less likely to sign a 
confession (32.5%) than guilty participants (88.4%), Χ2 (1, N=166) = 54.61, p < .001, r = .57 
[CI: .45, .68].  Innocent participants were also less likely to accept a plea deal (40.7%) than 
guilty participants (73.8%), Χ2 (1, N=161) = 17.91, p < .001, r = .33 [CI: .18, .47].  Because this 
is the first experimental study to include conditions with both plea and confession manipulations, 
it was important to establish the validity of the experimental paradigm.  The impact of the 
innocence-guilt condition on acceptance outcomes supports the validity of the cheating 
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manipulation as a method to randomly assign study participants to guilt or innocence for both 
confession and plea studies.      
Innocent participants who heard the evidence-bluff exhibited a false confession rate that 
was somewhat higher (40.5%) than innocent participants who did not hear the evidence-bluff 
(23.7%), Χ2 (1, N=80) = 2.56, p = .086, r = .18 [CI: -.04, .38].  The r effect size was moderate 
and in the predicted direction.  Unfortunately, the confidence interval around the effect size 
included a possible effect of zero, which was consistent with the non-significant p-value.  Thus, 
the direction of the effect of evidence-bluffs on confession behaviors among the innocent is not 
entirely clear.  More interestingly, in contradiction to what was hypothesized, the evidence-bluff 
manipulation had no significant impact on plea decisions among the innocent, Χ2 (1, N=81) = 
.003, p = .570, r = .006 [CI: -.21, .22].  The evidence-bluff manipulation also had no impact on 
the guilty in either the confession or plea conditions, Χ2 (1, N=86) = .000, p = .631; Χ2 (1, N=80) 
= 1.61, p = .155, r = .14 [CI: -.08, .35].  However, acceptance outcomes among the guilty were 
near ceiling consequently minimizing any potential impact of the evidence-bluff manipulation 
(refer to Table 1). 
Table 1. 
Rates of acceptance (i.e., statement signing) among all eight experimental conditions.   
Pleas Confessions 
Innocent Guilty Innocent Guilty 
No Bluff 
(N = 42) 
Bluff 
(N = 39) 
No Bluff 
(N = 40) 
Bluff 
(N = 40) 
No Bluff 
(N = 38) 
Bluff 
(N = 42) 
No Bluff 
(N = 43) 
Bluff 
(N = 43) 
40.5% 
(n = 17) 
41.0% 
(n = 16) 
80.0% 
(n = 32) 
67.5%   
(n = 27) 
23.7% 
(n = 9) 
40.5%   
(n = 17) 
88.4%   
(n = 38) 
88.4%   
(n = 38) 
Note. The actual number of participants represented by each percentage is listed in parentheses. 
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The diagnosticity ratio of plea acceptance over all conditions was 1.81 (73.8% true plea 
acceptance / 40.7% false plea acceptance), which is very low.  In other words, among the current 
sample, someone who accepted a plea was only 1.81 times more likely to be guilty of cheating 
than someone who rejected a plea.  This ratio is close to the 1.52 diagnosticity ratio of plea 
acceptance found in Wilford (2012).  The diagnosticity of a signed confession was higher than 
the diagnosticity of plea acceptance at 2.72, which still seems low.  In fact, there was a 
significant interaction between innocence-guilt and confession-plea on acceptance outcomes 
showing that when participants were in plea conditions, acceptance rates were less affected by 
actual innocence-guilt relative to confession conditions, β = -1.37, Wald = 6.43, p = .011.  To 
summarize, in the current study, a signed confession was more diagnostic of guilt than a signed 
plea, but neither were highly indicative of guilt.   
Reasons for Acceptance/Rejection 
 The driving motivation behind this work was to examine the potential differences 
between plea and confession behaviors.  Consequently, it was important to include a measure to 
illuminate the factors that led participants to accept or reject plea deals versus the factors that led 
participants to accept or reject confession statements.  If participants in plea conditions are found 
to produce different reasons for their decisions than participants in confession conditions, the 
reasons provided could reveal some of the distinctions between these two constructs. 
Reasons for Signing the Confession or Plea Deal.  After the experimenter returned from 
calling the professor to report what had happened during the accusation phase of the study (i.e., 
whether the participant had agreed to accept the plea deal or sign the confession), participants 
were asked to report their reason for signing or refusing to sign the plea or confession statement.  
All participants were asked the question in an open-ended format.  The wording only differed 
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with regards to framing the question according to whether they agreed or refused to sign the 
statement written out for them.  Consequently, the results will be presented separately for 
participants who were asked why they agreed to sign the statement versus participants who were 
asked why they refused (refer to Table 2 and Table 3, respectively).   
Table 2. 
Frequency of reasons for acceptance of the plea agreement or confession statement among the 
guilty and innocent participants 
 
 Innocent  Guilty 
 Plea Confession  Plea Confession 
Easier Alternative 20.6% (7) 23.1% (6) Easier Alternative 42.4% (25) 6.7% (5) 
Pressure 47.1% (16) 38.5% (10) Pressure 10.2% (6) 26.7% (20) 
Fear 11.8% (4) 0.0% (0) Fear 22.0% (13) 0.0% (0) 
Miscellaneous 20.6% (7) 38.5% (10) Guilty 15.3% (9) 52.0% (39) 
   Miscellaneous 10.2% (6) 14.7% (11) 
Note. N = (x). 
 
All of the reasons participants provided for signing the statement were coded into categories.  
Due to the open-ended format of the question, several categories were initially identified.  In 
order to conduct an omnibus chi-square analysis however, categories with expected values less 
than five had to be collapsed into a “Miscellaneous” category.  Among the guilty, the pattern of 
responses provided for signing the statement varied significantly by plea and confession 
conditions, Χ2 (4, N=134) = 59.94, p < .001.  The pattern of responses for signing the statement 
did not vary significantly among the innocent, Χ2 (3, N=60) = 5.01, p = .17.  It should be noted, 
however, that the number of innocent participants who accepted the statement was dramatically 
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lower (N = 60) than the number of innocent participants who rejected the statement (N = 134) 
thereby limiting the potential for a significant chi-square value.   
Reasons for Rejecting the Confession or Plea Deal.  Participants who refused to sign the 
confession or plea deal were asked to provide their reasoning for their refusal.  The question was 
framed with reference to their refusal to sign the statement and participants were asked the 
question in an open-ended format.   
Table 3. 
 
Frequency of reasons for rejection of the plea agreement or confession statement among the 
guilty and innocent participants 
 
 Innocent  Guilty 
 Plea Confession  Plea Confession 
Innocent 74.5% (35) 79.6% (43) Innocent 57.1% (12) 80.0% (8) 
Untrue 0.0% (0) 14.8% (8) Miscellaneous 42.9% (9) 20.0% (2) 
Vague Deal 8.5% (4) 1.9% (1)    
Miscellaneous 17.0% (8) 3.7% (2)    
Note. N = (x). 
 
The reasons produced by innocent participants for refusing to sign the statement in plea versus 
confession conditions varied significantly, Χ2 (3, N=101) = 13.80, p = .003.  The reasons for 
refusal did not differ significantly among the guilty, Χ2 (1, N=31) = 1.55, p = .202, r = .22 [CI: -
.13, .53].  Again, the number of participants included in each of the analyses was dramatically 
different due to the higher proportion of guilty participants accepting the statement.  Overall, 
these findings provide some evidence that the factors driving plea and confession outcomes 
differ.  
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Post-Accusation Measures 
 All participants were asked a series of questions after they agreed/refused to sign the plea 
agreement or confession statement during the accusation phase of the study (refer to Appendix 
J).  These questions were designed to measure participants’ perceptions of the situation (e.g., 
likelihood of the cheating charge, willingness to sign the statement, strength and plausibility of 
the evidence, etc.).  It is important to note that these measures are exploratory in nature, and data 
gathered during this phase of the study could be affected by the participants’ increasing suspicion 
that the entire accusation could be a ruse.  That said, the data can still be informative and the 
analyses provide some interesting results. This particular series of questions included 12 items 
although three of these items were only administered to participants in evidence-bluff conditions.  
Those items are presented separately.  This section will summarize the impact of the 
experimental independent variables on participants’ responses to these post-accusation measures.  
Non-significant measures will not be discussed, but a summary of the means and standard 
deviations in each condition for the post-accusation measures can be found in Appendix M.  
Nine 2 (innocent or guilty) x 2 (confession or plea) x 2 (evidence-bluff or no-bluff) ANOVAs 
were conducted—each of the post-accusation measures were included as the dependent variable 
in separate ANOVAs.   
 Likelihood of Charge.  This question was measured on a ten-point Likert-type scale from 
1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 10 (Extremely Likely).  Innocent participants perceived the chances of 
them being charged with cheating as significantly less likely than guilty participants, F(1, 325) = 
118.72, MSE = 591.33, p < .001, r = .51 [CI: .42, .60].  Participants in the no-bluff conditions 
viewed their chances of being charged with cheating as higher than participants in evidence-bluff 
conditions, F(1, 325) = 5.85, MSE = 29.16, p = .016, r = .30 [CI: .20, .40].  
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 Willingness to Sign.  Participants were asked to indicate how willing they were to sign the 
statement (either the plea deal or confession statement).  This question was measured on a six-
point Likert-type scale from 1 (Not at all Willing) to 6 (Totally Willing).  Not surprisingly, 
innocent participants were less willing than guilty participants to sign the statement presented to 
them, F(1, 326) = 80.14, MSE = 162.16, p < .001, r = .44 [CI: .34, .53].   
Evidence Strength.  Participants were asked how strong they felt the evidence against 
them was.  This question was measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale from 1 (Very Weak) to 
7 (Very Strong).  Guilty participants felt the evidence against them was stronger than innocent 
participants, F(1, 325) = 60.45, MSE = 204.58, p < .001, r = .39 [CI: .29, .49].  More 
interestingly, participants in plea conditions rated the strength of the evidence against them as 
being stronger than did participants in confession conditions, F(1, 325) = 7.79, MSE = 26.35, p = 
.006, r = .16 [CI: .05, .26].  Participants’ perceived strength of the evidence against them was 
also impacted by a three-way interaction among innocence-guilt, confession-plea, and the 
evidence-bluff, F(1, 325) = 6.03, MSE = 20.41, p = .015, r = .34 [CI: .24, .43].  A linear 
regression was conducted to determine the pattern of this three-way interaction (refer to Figure 
2).  Innocent participants in the plea conditions viewed the evidence as weaker when exposed to 
the evidence-bluff whereas innocent participants in confession conditions viewed the evidence as 
stronger when exposed to the evidence-bluff.  Guilty participants in the no-bluff conditions 
viewed the evidence as stronger when in the confession conditions, but weaker when in the plea 
conditions.  Before reading too deeply into this finding, it is important to remember that as 
previously mentioned, while these post-accusation questions are being asked, participants are 
likely growing increasingly suspicious of the study objectives. 
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Figure 1.  Three-Way Interaction of Innocence-Guilt, Confession-Plea, and the Bluff on 
Participants’ Perceived Strength of Evidence 
 
Evidence Plausibility.  Participants also reported the plausibility of the evidence against 
them.  This question was measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all Plausible) to 5 
(Very Plausible).  Evidence plausibility was perceived as higher by guilty participants than 
innocence participants, F(1, 325) = 38.63, MSE = 75.65, p < .001, r = .33 [CI: .22, .42].  
Participants in plea conditions also rated the evidence as more plausible than participants in 
confession conditions, F(1, 325) = 4.09, MSE = 8.01, p = .044, r = .11 [CI: .00, .22].   
Trapped into Signing.  Experimenters asked participants how trapped they felt into 
signing the statement (either a plea deal or confession statement).  This question was measured 
on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all Trapped) to 5 (Totally Trapped).  Guilty 
participants felt more trapped into signing the statement than innocent participants, F(1, 324) = 
4.93, MSE = 11.04, p = .027, r = .12 [CI: .01, .23].   
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Scared of Consequences.  Participants were also asked to indicate how frightened they 
were of the potential consequences of the cheating accusation.  This question was measured on a 
five-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all Frightened) to 5 (Very Frightened).  Guilty participants 
were more frightened of the consequences than innocent participants, F(1, 325) = 27.74, MSE = 
57.06, p < .001, r = .28 [CI: .17, .37].  Participants in plea conditions were more scared of the 
consequences of the cheating accusation than participants in confession conditions, F(1, 325) = 
9.39, MSE = 19.32, p = .002, r = .17 [CI: .06, .27].    
Anxiety During Accusation.  Participants were asked to report how anxious they felt 
during the accusation phase of the study.  This question was measured on a five-point Likert 
scale from 1 (Not at all Anxious) to 5 (Totally Anxious).  Innocent participants reported being 
less anxious during the cheating accusation than guilty participants, F(1, 325) = 27.63, MSE = 
48.42, p < .001, r = .28 [CI: .17, .38].  Innocence-guilt interacted with the presence/absence of 
the evidence-bluff to impact participants’ anxiety during the accusation phase of the study, F(1, 
325) = 3.93, MSE = 6.88, p = .048, r = .28 [CI: .18, .38].  In order to investigate the direction of 
this two-way interaction, a linear regression was conducted and graphed (refer to Figure 1).  It 
appears that innocence-guilt had a larger impact on reported anxiety in evidence-bluff conditions 
than in the no-bluff conditions.   
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Figure 2.  Two-Way Interaction of Innocence-Guilt and the Bluff on Participants’ Reported 
Anxiety 
 
Pressure to Sign.  Experimenters asked participants to estimate how much pressure they 
felt to sign the statement.  This question was measured on a ten-point Likert-type scale from 1 
(No Pressure at All) to 10 (Most Pressure I Could Imagine).  Guilty participants reported feeling 
more pressured to sign the statement than innocent participants, F(1, 325) = 20.69, MSE = 
111.22, p < .001, r = .24 [CI: .14, .34].      
Relief After Debriefing.  Finally, participants were asked how relieved they were after 
finding out the cheating accusation was false.  This question was measured on a five-point Likert 
scale from 1 (Not at All Relieved) to 5 (Extremely Relieved).  Guilty participants were more 
relieved than innocent participants upon hearing the accusation was fake, F(1, 324) = 11.53, 
MSE = 17.50, p = .001, r = .19 [CI: .08, .29].  Participants who heard the evidence-bluff were 
less relieved upon finding out the accusation was false than participants who did not hear the 
bluff, F(1, 324) = 4.09, MSE = 6.21, p = .044, r = .11 [CI: .00, .22].  
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The Bluff.  Separate pair-wise comparisons were conducted to examine the impact of the 
evidence-bluff on post-accusation measures for the innocent versus the guilty.  Non-significant 
measures will not be discussed, but the means and standard deviations for each post-accusation 
measure separated by condition can be found in Appendix M.  Among the innocent, participants 
who heard the evidence-bluff manipulation reported the chances that they would be charged with 
cheating as significantly less likely than those that did not receive the bluff manipulation, t(160) 
= -3.72, p < .001, r = .28 [CI: .13, .42].  This difference is consistent with the idea that innocent 
participants would view the bluff-video as potentially exonerating thereby decreasing the 
perceived threat of the cheating charge. Innocent participants who heard the evidence-bluff were 
less anxious than those that did not hear the bluff, t(159) = -2.70, p = .008, r = .21 [CI: .06, .35].  
Guilty participants who heard the evidence-bluff felt more trapped into signing the plea or 
confession than those that did not hear the bluff, although the effect was not significant, t(161) = 
1.97, p = .051, r = .15 [CI: .00, .30].  
 In a more direct measure of the impact that the bluff-video had on participants’ decisions 
to sign or not sign the plea deal or confession statement, participants were asked whether the 
video made them less or more willing to sign the statement; they were also given the option of 
stating that the video had no impact on their willingness to sign the statement.  Innocent 
participants reported that the video made them less willing to sign the statement 24.3% of the 
time; guilty participants said it made them less willing only 13.9% of the time.  Further, guilty 
participants reported that the video made them more willing to sign the statement (48.1%) more 
often than innocent participants (18.9%).  Thus, it does seem like the evidence-bluff 
manipulation was having the generally expected differential effect on innocent versus guilty 
participants, Χ2 (2, N=153) = 14.62, p = .001 (Table 4).  Guilty participants were typically more 
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willing to sign the plea deal or confession statement when in evidence-bluff conditions whereas 
the innocent were typically less willing to sign the plea deal or confession statement.   
Table 4.  
Did the existence of the video make you more willing to sign the statement, less willing, or did it 
not have an effect on your decision? 
 
 Less No Effect More 
Innocent 24.3% (18) 56.8% (42) 18.9% (14) 
Guilty 13.9% (11) 38.0% (30) 48.1% (38) 
Note. N = (x). 
 
Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World 
Scale Validation. Because the Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World scale is new, it 
was also administered to a separate sample of students as part of a mass scale validation survey.  
This second sample was not taken for the purpose of validating the current version of the scale 
for inclusion in the larger study (due to time constraints a re-draft of the scale was impractical), 
but rather to have an independent source of data separate from the study sample.  One hundred 
and twenty-two participants provided complete responses to the Positive-Negative Belief in a 
Just World scale.  This sample size meets the minimum general recommendation for exploratory 
factor analyses of five to ten cases per measure (although this recommendation does not account 
for variation in the communalities of the variables; Russell, 2002).  A principal factor analysis 
with Oblimin rotation was conducted on both the Positive and Negative Belief in a Just World 
scales (Brown, 2006; Widaman 1993). Unfortunately, the communalities among both the 
Positive and Negative items are extremely variable with some scoring moderate to low (below 
.50; refer to Table 5).  Consequently, a larger sample size is necessary to ensure the findings in 
the exploratory factor analyses are stable (Russell, 2002).   
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Table 5. 
 
Communalities among the items in the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scale. 
 Communalities  Communalities 
 Initial Extraction  Initial Extraction 
PBJW1 .497 .580 NBJW1 .140 .104 
PBJW2rev .034 .182 NBJW2rev .221 .550 
PBJW3rev .144 .190 NBJW3 .456 .938 
PBJW4 .362 .394 NBJW4 .415 .424 
PBJW5 .589 .918 NBJW5rev .027 .033 
PBJW6rev .017 .016 NBJW6rev .234 .379 
Note. Principal axis factoring. 
The number of factors represented in the Positive-Belief in a Just World and Negative-
Belief in a Just World scales were evaluated using two different methods (Russell, 2002).  First, 
the principal axis factoring analysis included in the SPSS statistical software program provided 
factor loadings.  Second, the scree test was done with a scree plot constructed with the 
eigenvalues of each factor.  The Positive-Belief in a Just World measure produces two factor 
loadings, but only one item is included on the second factor—all factor loadings above .30 are 
shown in bold (Table 6; Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  The scree plot, on the other hand, appears to 
have its only substantial drop after one factor (Figure 3).  
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Table 6. 
Factor loadings for the Positive-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 2 
PBJW1 .748 -.142 
PBJW2rev -.051 .423 
PBJW3rev .406 -.160 
PBJW4 .627 .023 
PBJW5 .940 .182 
PBJW6rev .105 .071 
 
 
Figure 3.  Positive-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues. 
 
The Negative-Belief in a Just World measure appears to be more split than the Positive-
Belief in a Just World Measure.  Two factors are produced in the factor loadings and all factor 
loadings above .30 are shown in bold (Table 7).  Further, the scree plot appears to plateau after 
three factors (Figure 4).  
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Table 7.  
Factor loadings for the Negative-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 2 
NBJW1 .315 .067 
NBJW2rev -.140 .729 
NBJW3 .946 .205 
NBJW4 .647 .072 
NBJW5rev -.002 .181 
NBJW6rev -.295 .541 
 
 
Figure 4.  Negative-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues. 
Closer inspection of the factor loadings for the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just 
World scales reveals that the weakest factor loadings appear to be produced primarily by items 
that were reverse-coded.  Thus, to determine the relation between the reverse-coded and 
standard-coded items, both the Positive-Belief in a Just World and Negative-Belief in a Just 
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World scales were each separated into reverse- and standard-coded measures (producing four 
separate scales).  The two Positive-Belief in a Just World Scales and the two Negative-Belief in a 
Just World scales were then correlated with the Global Belief in a Just World Scale (refer to 
Tables 8 and 9).  If the reverse-coded scales produced strong correlations with the standard 
coded scales and the Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW) scale, there would be evidence that 
the split factors are an artifact of how the items were measured rather than the result of a 
meaningful difference among the items. 
Table 8. 
Correlation matrix including the Positive-Belief in a Just World measure broken into reverse-
coded and standard coded items along with the Global Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 122. **p < .001; *p < .01  
 
Correlation analyses showed a significant correlation between Positive-Belief in a Just 
World standard items and GBJW, r(119) = .58, CI: [.45, .69], p < .001.  There was also a 
significant correlation between Positive-Belief in a Just World reverse-coded items and GBJW, 
r(119) = .42, CI: [.26, .56], p < .001.  Finally, a significant correlation emerged between the 
standard and reverse-coded Positive-Belief in a Just World items, r(119) = .24, CI: [.06, .40], p = 
.009.  These findings support the possibility that the two factors produced in the factor loadings 
are primarily due to some sort of measurement bias in the reverse-coded items. 
 
 
 
 GBJWTot PBJWTot PBJWTotrev 
GBJWTot     
PBJWTot .58**    
PBJWTotrev .42**  
.24* 
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Table 9. 
 
Correlation matrix including the Negative-Belief in a Just World measure broken into reverse-
coded and standard coded items along with the Global Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 122. *p < .001 
 
The Negative-Belief in a Just World standard items were significantly correlated with the 
GBJW scale, r(120) = .44, CI: [.28, .57], p < .001.  The reverse-coded Negative-Belief in a Just 
World items and GBJW scale were not significantly correlated, r(120) = .06, CI: [-.12, .24], p = 
.49.  Nor was the standard and reverse-coded Negative-Belief in a Just World items correlated 
with each other.  These findings seem to imply that the standard and reverse-coded Negative-
Belief in a Just World items might be measuring two distinct constructs.    
Reliability analyses revealed more information regarding the strength and relationships 
among items in both the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scales.  The Positive-
Belief in a Just World scale produced a Cronbach’s α of .56; however, the potential reliability 
could increase with the removal of items two and six (refer to Appendix C).  The Negative-
Belief in a Just World Scale produced a Cronbach’s α of .56 as well, which could be potentially 
increased with the removal of the fifth and sixth items.   
Study Data.  The previous analyses were also conducted on the Positive-Negative Belief 
in a Just World data collected during the actual study session.  Three hundred and twenty-five 
participants provided complete responses to the Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World scale.  
This sample size greatly exceeds the minimum general recommendation for exploratory factor 
 GBJWTot NBJWTot NBJWTotrev 
GBJWTot     
NBJWTot .44*    
NBJWTotrev .063  
-.072 
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analyses of 5 to 10 cases per measure (Russell, 2002).  Just as with the scale validation data, 
principal factor analyses with Oblimin rotation were conducted on both the Positive and 
Negative Belief in a Just World scales (Brown, 2006; Widaman 1993). The communalities 
among both the Positive and Negative items were extremely variable again with some scoring 
moderate to low (below .50; refer to Table 10).  However, it is possible that the substantial 
sample size might be enough to provide stable estimates despite the low communalities (Russell, 
2002).   
Table 10. 
 
Communalities among the items in the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scale. 
 Communalities  Communalities 
 Initial Extraction  Initial Extraction 
PBJW1 .231 .335 NBJW1 .109 .203 
PBJW2rev .019 .031 NBJW2rev .129 .267 
PBJW3rev .104 .210 NBJW3 .160 .434 
PBJW4 .165 .231 NBJW4 .138 .253 
PBJW5 .289 .607 NBJW5rev .050 .091 
PBJW6rev .053 .280 NBJW6rev .148 .420 
Note. Principal axis factoring 
The number of factors in the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scales were 
assessed using the same two methods as were used with the scale validation data.  First, factor 
loadings provided in the SPSS principal axis factoring analyses were evaluated.  Second, the 
scree test was performed with scree plots charting the eigenvalues of each factor.  The Positive-
Belief in a Just World measure still resulted in two factors though only one item loaded onto the 
second factor—factor loadings above .30 are shown in bold (Table 11).  However, the scree plot 
still appears to have its only noticeable drop after one factor (refer to Figure 5).   
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Table 11. 
Factor loadings for the Positive-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 2 
PBJW1 .569 -.104 
PBJW2rev .075 .160 
PBJW3rev .363 .280 
PBJW4 .479 -.043 
PBJW5 .760 -.174 
PBJW6rev .201 .490 
 
Figure 5.  Positive-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues. 
The Negative-Belief in a Just World measure still appears more split than the Positive-
Belief in a Just World Measure.  Two stable factors emerged again and all factor loadings above 
.30 are shown in bold (Table 12). This time, however, the scree plot appears to level off after two 
(rather than three) factors (refer to Figure 6).  
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Table 12. 
Factor loadings for the Negative-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 2 
NBJW1 .363 .267 
NBJW2rev -.295 .425 
NBJW3 .548 .366 
NBJW4 .474 .170 
NBJW5rev -.175 .245 
NBJW6rev -.447 .469 
 
Figure 6.  Negative-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues. 
Thus, it appears as if the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale consistently loads on to one 
primary factor with only one or two items contributing to a second factor.  The Negative-Belief 
in a Just World scale appears consistently split between two factors although the split seems to 
stem from standard versus reverse-coded items.  Thus, the previous correlation analyses splitting 
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the standard and reverse-coded items for both the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World 
scales were done again, this time with the study data (refer to Tables 13 and 14). 
Table 13. 
 
Correlation matrix including the Positive-Belief in a Just World measure broken into reverse-
coded and standard coded items along with the Global Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 328. **p < .001  
 
The correlations of the standard and reverse-coded Positive-Belief in a Just World items 
with Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW) were both significant again, r(328) = .51, CI: [.43, 
.59], p < .001; r(328) = .22, CI: [.11, .32], p < .001, respectively.  The correlation between the 
standard and reverse-coded Positive-Belief in a Just World items was also significant, r(328) = 
.20, CI: [.09, .30], p < .001. 
Table 14. 
 
Correlation matrix including the Negative-Belief in a Just World measure broken into reverse-
coded and standard coded items along with the Global Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 328. **p < .001, * p < .01  
 
 GBJWTot PBJWTot PBJWTotrev 
GBJWTot     
PBJWTot .51**    
PBJWTotrev .22**  
.20** 
 
 
 
 GBJWTot NBJWTot NBJWTotrev 
GBJWTot     
NBJWTot .40**    
NBJWTotrev .15*  
-.08 
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There was still no significant correlation between the standard and reverse-coded 
Negative-Belief in a Just World items.  However, both the standard and reverse-coded items 
significantly correlated with GBJW, r(328) = .40, CI: [.30, .49], p < .001; r(327) = .15, CI: [.04, 
.25], p = .007, respectively.   
The reliability analyses were also relatively consistent with the previous reliability 
analyses using the scale validation data.  The Positive-Belief in a Just World measure produced a 
Cronbach’s α of .49, which would potentially improve with the removal of the second item.  The 
Cronbach’s α for the Negative-Belief in a Just World scale was .33 with no clear improvement 
resulting from the exclusion of certain items.    
Modified Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World Scale 
Positive-Belief in a Just World Modified Scale.  After examining the scale validation and 
study data, both the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scales were modified to 
improve their validity and reliability.  Items 2 and 6 (which were both reverse-coded) were 
removed from the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale due to their consistently low performance 
in factor analyses and reliability tests (refer to Appendix C).  All previous analyses were 
conducted using the modified version of the Positive-Belief in a Just World Scale.     
Table 15. 
 
Communalities among the items in the Modified Positive-Belief in a Just World scale. 
 
Communalities 
Initial Extraction 
PBJW1 .227 .349 
PBJW3rev .066 .095 
PBJW4 .163 .236 
PBJW5 .286 .570 
Note. Principal axis factoring 
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Table 16. 
Factor loadings for the Positive-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 
PBJW1 .591 
PBJW3rev .308 
PBJW4 .486 
PBJW5 .755 
 
Figure 7.  Positive-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues 
The modified version of the Positive-Belief in Just World scale clearly loads onto a single 
factor in accordance with both the factor loadings (Table 17) and the scree test (Figure 7).   
Further, the reliability of the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale improved to produce a 
Cronbach’s α of .57.  Although the reliability of the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale (even 
after the modification) is still somewhat low, this modified scale will be used in subsequent 
.00 
.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
1 2 3 4 
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
s 
Factor Number 
  
	  
78 
analyses and will now be referred to as the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale (not the 
modified version).   
Negative-Belief in a Just World Modified Scale.  Items were also removed from the 
Negative-Belief in a Just World scale due to their consistently low performance in the reliability 
and factor analyses.  The second, fifth and sixth items were excluded from subsequent analyses 
and the modified scale was evaluated again using the previous analyses (refer to Appendix C). 
Table 17. 
Communalities among the items in the Positive-Belief in a Just World scale excluding Item 2. 
 
Communalities 
Initial Extraction 
NBJW1 .101 .194 
NBJW3 .157 .432 
NBJW4 .122 .245 
Note. Principal axis factoring 
Table 18. 
Factor loadings for the Positive-Belief in a Just World Measure 
 
Factor 
1 
NBJW1 .440 
NBJW3 .657 
NBJW4 .494 
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Figure 8.  Negative-Belief in a Just World Scree Plot of Principal Axis Factor Eigenvalues. 
The modified version of the Negative-Belief in Just World scale clearly loads onto a 
single factor (refer to Table 18 and Figure 8).  The reliability of the modified Negative-Belief in 
a Just World scale has also improved to produce a Cronbach’s α of .53, which is still not very 
high.  Despite the moderate reliability of the Negative-Belief in a Just World scale, this modified 
scale will be used in subsequent analyses and will be referred to now as the Negative-Belief in a 
Just World scale (not a modified version).   
Correlation analyses were performed to evaluate the relationship among the three belief 
in a just world measures—Global Belief in a Just World, Positive-Belief in a Just World, and 
Negative-Belief in a Just World (Table 19).  As hypothesized both the Positive- and Negative 
Belief in a Just World measures correlate significantly with Global Belief in a Just World, r(328) 
= .48, CI: [.39, .56], p < .001; r(328) = .40, CI: [.30, .49], p < .001, respectively.  The Positive- 
and Negative-Belief in a Just World measures correlated significantly with each other although 
the size of this correlation is lower than their correlations with Global Belief in a Just World, 
.00 
.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
1 2 3 
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
s 
Factor Number 
  
	  
80 
r(328) = .14, CI: [.03, .24], p = .014.  This finding supports the idea that both scales are 
measuring belief in a just world more broadly, but each might be capturing different aspects of 
the phenomenon.  However, the Global Belief in a Just World construct is more reliable and has 
more items than both the Positive- and Negative-Belief in a Just World scales.  Thus, it is also 
possible that each scale is more strongly correlated with Global Belief in a Just World simply 
because the Global Belief in a Just World scale is more reliable and stable. 
Table 19. 
 
Correlation matrix with the modified PBJW and NBJW measures and the Global BJW measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 328. **p < .001, *p < .05  
 
 Correlation analyses were also conducted to examine the relations among the Positive-
Belief in a Just World scale and other individual difference measures, including the Big Five 
Aspects.  Positive-Belief in a Just World correlated significantly with self-esteem, in accordance 
with previous literature, r(328) = .24, CI: [.14, .34], p < .001, (Hafer & Begue, 2005).  The 
Negative-Belief in a Just World measure did not correlate significantly with self-esteem, r(328) 
= -.03, CI: [-.14, .08], p = .62.  This finding could help to illuminate some of the potential 
differences between a positive and negative endorsement of just world beliefs.  Further, as 
hypothesized, the Negative-Belief in a Just World measure did produce a negative correlation 
with the compassionate aspect of agreeableness, r(328) = -.22, CI: [-.32, -.11], p < .001.  This 
finding fits in well with the idea that a negative endorsement of belief in a just world focuses 
 GBJWTot PBJWModTot NBJWModTot 
GBJWTot     
PBJWModTot .48**    
NBJWModTot .40**  
.14* 
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more on bad things happening to bad people, which could result in a lack of compassion for the 
suffering of other people.   
Individual Difference Measures 
All of the individual difference measures were tested for reliability.  With the exception 
of the new Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World measures and the Private Self Consciousness 
scale, all the individual difference measures attained Cronbach’s αs > .75 (refer to Appendix L). 
The Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW) scale significantly correlated with the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) scale, r(328) = .27, CI: [.17, .37], p < .001, which is consistent 
with literature that supports a well-being function of belief in a just world (Hafer & Begue, 
2005).  Self-esteem was also negatively correlated with both volatility, r(328) = -.39, CI: [-.48, -
.29], p < .001, and withdrawal, r(328) = -.61, CI: [-.67, -.54], p < .001)—the two aspects of 
neuroticism.  These correlations are in line with the more positive outlook that comes with higher 
self-esteem.  Self-esteem significantly correlated with both aspects of extraversion (enthusiasm, 
r(328) = .41, CI: [.32, .50], p < .001, and assertiveness, r(328) = .35, CI: [.25, .44], p < .001).  
Self-esteem also had strong positive correlations with the industrious aspect of 
conscientiousness, r(328) = .48, CI: [.39, .56], p < .001, and the intelligent aspect of openness, 
r(328) = .27, CI: [.17, .37], p < .001.  Private self-consciousness correlated significantly with the 
compassionate aspect of agreeableness, r(182) = .25, CI: [.11, .38], p = .001.  Private self-
consciousness also correlated significantly with both openness, r(182) = .42, CI: [.29, .53], p < 
.001, and intelligence, r(182) = .25, CI: [.11, .38], p = .001—the two aspects of openness.  The 
correlations between private self-consciousness and aspects of openness seem inconsistent with 
previous research denying a direct connection between self-consciousness and intelligence 
(Carver & Glass, 1976).  However, in the previous study, intelligence was measured as IQ rather 
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than as a component of personality.  Thus, it does appear as if private self-consciousness could 
be related to intelligence or curiosity as a component of personality.     
Among the Big Five Aspects, the pattern of significant relationships was consistent, for 
the most part, with other research examining associations among the Big Five Aspects (DeYoung 
et al., 2007).  The volatile aspect of neuroticism negatively correlated with the polite aspect of 
agreeableness, r(328) = -.33, CI: [-.42, -.23], p < .001, and the enthusiasm aspect of extraversion, 
r(328) = -.23, CI: [-.33, -.12], p < .001.  Volatility also had a negative correlation with 
conscientious industriousness, r(328) = -.29, CI: [-.39, -.19], p < .001, and intelligent openness, 
r(328) = -.24, CI: [-.34, -.14], p < .001).  Withdrawn neuroticism shared a negative relationship 
with intelligent openness, r(328)= -.31, CI: [-.40, -.21], p < .001, and conscientious 
industriousness, r(328) = -.48, CI: [-.56, -.39], p < .001.  Withdraw was also negatively related to 
both aspects of extraversion—enthusiasm, r(328) = -.34, CI: [-.43, -.24], p < .001) and 
assertiveness, r(328) = -.41, CI: [-.50, -.32], p < .001.  Compassionate agreeableness was 
positively correlated with both aspects of extraversion (enthusiasm, r(328) = .46, CI: [.37, .54], p 
< .001, and assertiveness, r(328) = .22, CI: [.11, .32], p < .001) and both aspects of openness 
(openness, r(328) = .41, CI: [.32, .50], p < .001, and intelligence, r(328) = .24, CI: [.14, .34], p < 
.001).  Polite agreeableness was negatively correlated with assertiveness, r(328) = -.23, CI: [-.33, 
-.12], p < .001) and positively correlated with conscientiousness, r(328) = .20, CI: [.09, .30], p < 
.001.  Conscientious industriousness was significantly correlated with both the enthusiastic, 
r(328) = .24, CI: [.14, .34], p < .001, and assertive, r(328) = .32, CI: [.22, .41], p < .001, aspects 
of extraversion.  Intelligence was correlated with industriousness and assertiveness, r(328) = .31, 
CI: [.21, .40], p < .001; r(328) = .36, CI: [.26, .45], p < .001, respectively.  
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Belief in a Just World as a Moderator of Plea and Confession Behaviors 
Multiple hierarchical logistic regressions tested whether the predicted individual 
difference variables interacted with innocence-guilt to moderate the rates of signing the plea or 
signing the confession.  Separate logistic regressions were run on participants in plea versus 
confession conditions (i.e., each logistic regression examined the acceptance outcomes in plea 
conditions or in confession conditions).  Logistic regressions were run only on variables that had 
been originally hypothesized to moderate acceptance outcomes.  Step one of each regression 
included both innocence-guilt and the theoretically-relevant individual difference measure.  
Entering both variables at step one of the analyses helped to ensure that any covariance of the 
two (by chance) would be excluded from the model.   Step two included the interaction variable, 
which was computed by multiplying the innocence-guilt and the individual difference variables.  
All of the individual difference variables were mean-centered, and all of the dichotomous 
variables were dummy coded with the values 1 and 2.  All of the analyses controlled for 
variables that were moderately correlated with the individual difference variable. 
The Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW) scale did not interact with innocence-guilt to 
affect plea outcomes, β = -.40, Wald = .41, p = .52.  This finding was surprising in light of 
previous research that found a significant moderating effect of GBJW with innocence-guilt on 
plea outcomes (Wilford, 2012).  However, as expected, GBJW also had no significant 
moderating effect on confession outcomes, β = .31, Wald = .36, p = .55.    
The Positive-Belief in a Just World measure also produced a non-significant interaction 
with innocence-guilt in impacting confession or plea outcomes, β = -.39, Wald = .36, p = .55; β = 
.32, Wald = .45, p = .50, respectively.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that the positive 
aspect of belief in a just world would not be salient in this particular research paradigm.  The 
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Negative-Belief in a Just World measure did not interact with innocence-guilt to impact 
confession decisions, β = .58, Wald = 1.10, p = .30, which was also consistent with predictions.  
The Negative-Belief in a Just World measure did appear to moderate plea decisions although the 
impact of the effect was not significant, β = .81, Wald = 3.17, p = .075 (refer to Figure 7).  The 
general pattern of this moderating effect comports primarily to what was predicted.  Guilty 
participants who expressed a Negative-Belief in a Just World were more likely to accept the plea 
than guilty participants who did not express a Negative-Belief in a Just World.  Interestingly, 
although not predicted, it appears that this effect was also present for innocent participants 
(though not as strongly).  But, the non-significance of the effect precludes any definitive 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
Fresh attention garnered by real-life cases like Kerry Max Cook and the West Memphis 
Three has helped to pave the way for plea-bargaining reform.  Further, recent decisions made by 
the Supreme Court have opened the door to further regulation in the plea system (Lafler v. 
Cooper, 2012; Missouri v. Frye, 2012).  Now is the time to explore the processes involved in 
plea bargaining decisions and behaviors.  Only through further research can policy be affected in 
a meaningful way.  Social psychology, with its emphasis on social influence and decision-
making, is an ideal field for this new domain of research. 
The Cheating Manipulation 
Due to the novelty of the current study, it was important to establish the validity of the 
current paradigm for experimentally studying both confession and plea behaviors.  The primary 
strength of the cheating manipulation is that it allows innocence and guilt to be randomly 
assigned.  However, if participants randomly assigned to be guilty do not behave differently than 
participants randomly assigned to be innocent, the validity of the manipulation would be 
questionable.  Clearly, however, the innocence-guilt manipulation affected numerous measures.  
Most important, perhaps, is the fact that the innocence-guilt manipulation affected acceptance 
outcomes in both the plea and confession conditions.  Further, the innocence-guilt manipulation 
produced significant differences in all nine of the post-accusation measures assessing 
participants’ views of the accusation and their prospects of being charged with cheating.  Three 
of the nine post-accusation measures dealt specifically with the phenomenological experience of 
the participants during the accusation phase, and upon hearing the accusation was false (i.e., 
feelings of anxiety, fear, relief).  Reported ratings on these emotional measures were 
significantly lower among the innocent relative to the guilty.  This finding is consistent with 
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previous research showing that innocent people tend to exhibit less physiological stress than 
guilty people when being interrogated (Guyll, Madon, Yang, Lannin, Scherr, & Greathouse, 
2013).  The consistency of these effects strongly supports the validity of the cheating 
manipulation as a way to randomly assign innocence and guilt in experiments examining both 
pleas and confessions. 
The Bluff 
 Unfortunately, the impact of the evidence-bluff manipulation was somewhat less 
consistent than the impact of the cheating manipulation.  Relative to the no-bluff conditions, the 
evidence-bluff manipulation reduced participants’ overall perceived likelihood of being charged 
with cheating and the relief reported upon hearing the accusation was false.  However, the 
evidence-bluff had no significant impact on participants’ overall willingness to sign, feelings of 
being trapped or pressured, fear of consequences, and anxiety during the accusation.  More 
surprisingly, the evidence-bluff had no significant impact on participants’ overall perceptions of 
the strength or plausibility of the evidence against them.   
When pair-wise comparisons were conducted to measure the impact of the evidence-bluff 
on the innocent and guilty separately, more effects of the bluff emerged.  Innocent participants 
who heard the evidence-bluff viewed the chances of being charged with cheating as lower than 
innocent participants who did not hear the bluff.  This finding is consistent with the idea that the 
evidence-bluff strengthens the phenomenology of innocence convincing innocent participants 
that the truth will prevail.  Innocent participants in evidence-bluff conditions were also less 
anxious during the accusation than those that did not hear the bluff.  Guilty participants who 
heard the evidence-bluff felt generally more trapped into signing the plea or confession 
statements than guilty participants unexposed to the bluff.   
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Finally, three other post-accusation measures more directly addressed the impact of the 
evidence-bluff.  One of these measures asked participants to determine whether the evidence-
bluff made them less, more, or had no impact on their willingness to sign the statement (plea or 
confession).  Generally, guilty participants indicated that the evidence-bluff made them more 
willing to sign the statement at a higher rate than innocent participants; relatedly, innocent 
participants stated that the evidence-bluff made them less willing to sign the statement at a 
higher rate than the guilty.  To summarize, the general impact of the evidence-bluff manipulation 
seems to support the idea that innocent participants view the bluff-video as a plus (i.e., evidence 
in favor of their innocence), whereas guilty participants tend to view the bluff-video as a 
negative (i.e., evidence supporting their guilt). 
The evidence-bluff manipulation was primarily included in the current work as a method 
of distinguishing pleas from confessions.  I had hypothesized that while the evidence-bluff would 
decrease the innocent’s resistance to falsely confess, it would have the opposite effect on false 
plea acceptance among the innocent.  Although the evidence-bluff did increase the proportion of 
innocent participants who signed the confession statement, the effect was not significant.  The 
magnitude of this effect illustrates a failure to replicate the large effect of the evidence-bluff on 
false confessions found by Perillo and Kassin (2011).  It seems like the primary source of the 
discrepancy between Perillo and Kassin’s significant finding and the current research’s non-
significant finding is the surprisingly high base rate of false confessions in the no-bluff control 
condition.  Innocent participants who did not hear the bluff never falsely confessed (0.0%) in 
Perillo and Kassin, but innocent participants in the current study who did not hear the bluff still 
falsely confessed 23.7% of the time.  On the other hand, the evidence-bluff manipulation 
increased false confessions to 40.5% in the current research and 50.0% in Perillo and Kassin—a 
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more comparable proportion.  In conclusion, the potential magnitude of the evidence-bluff effect 
was greater in the Perillo and Kassin study than in the current study.  But, it is possible that with 
more power, the ~16.8% increase in the false confession rate in the evidence-bluff condition 
would remain stable and the confidence interval would narrow to exclude zero.  The evidence-
bluff manipulation had no significant impact on the propensity of the guilty to confess, which is 
consistent with Perillo and Kassin.   
I had also predicted that the evidence-bluff would increase the resistance to falsely plea 
among the innocent relative to those who were not bluffed.  Because the evidence-bluff appears 
to strengthen the phenomenology of innocence such that the innocent truly believe they will be 
exonerated, it seemed plausible that the innocent would consequently be more resistant to the 
pressures to plea.  Why accept punishment for something you did not do, especially when your 
innocence will be inevitably discovered, as long as you do not accept the plea?  Unfortunately, 
the null impact of the evidence-bluff on plea decisions among the innocent renders any 
interpretations inconclusive.  It could be that the evidence-bluff does not strengthen the 
phenomenology of innocence.  Or, that the phenomenological experience of the innocent is 
already so strong that the evidence-bluff cannot increase it any further.  In other words, it is 
possible that innocent individuals already believe in their innocence and its inevitable discovery 
so strongly that the evidence-bluff could not strengthen this belief any further.   
It is also possible that the alterations made to the evidence-bluff manipulation for the 
current research made it somehow less effective than it was in Perillo and Kassin (2011).  More 
specifically, the addition of plea-bargaining conditions required that the evidence-bluff 
manipulation be modified to ensure that participants knew that their acceptance of the plea would 
erase any chance of accessing the video.  If participants in plea conditions felt that the video 
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could still be accessed later even if they signed the plea, it would reduce the ecological validity 
of the plea manipulation.  In real-world cases, once a plea bargain is accepted, no further 
evidence is examined or discovered.  Thus, the original evidence-bluff manipulation was altered 
to include additional information regarding the lifespan of the security video—participants were 
told that the security camera was limited to a 24-hour loop.  Participants in confession conditions 
were told that the professor was calling at that time to have the video saved.  Participants in plea 
conditions were told that the professor would only call to save the video if they chose to reject 
the plea.  These alterations made the bluff story more complex than it was in Perillo and Kassin 
(2011).  The added complexity of the evidence-bluff could have consequently impacted 
participants in unpredictable ways thereby concealing the predicted effects.        
 In conclusion, the evidence-bluff manipulation did not produce the hypothesized pattern.  
The effect of the evidence-bluff was not significant for the innocent or the guilty in plea or 
confession conditions.  
Pleas versus Confessions 
 Despite the absence of the predicted interaction between the evidence-bluff and plea-
confession manipulations on acceptance outcomes, there is some evidence indicating that the 
factors impacting confessions are different from those impacting pleas.  Specifically, participants 
in plea conditions perceived the evidence against them as stronger and more plausible than 
participants in confession conditions.  Participants in plea conditions were also more afraid of the 
consequences of not signing than participants in confession conditions.  These findings could 
collectively point to a difference in how pleas and confessions are perceived by participant-
suspects.     
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 Of more interest, participants’ open-ended responses as to why they accepted or rejected 
the statement offered to them differed significantly by plea versus confession conditions.  This 
analysis provides the best support (at least thus far) in favor of establishing a strong line of 
research on plea-bargaining (somewhat independent of research on confessions).  When 
participants were confronted with the decision to sign the statement presented to them, the 
primary factors they considered differed by whether the statement was a plea deal or a 
confession.  Guilty individuals who chose to accept the plea often reported that it was the easier 
alternative (42.4%) while guilty individuals who chose to confess rarely described it as the easier 
alternative (6.7%).  Instead, guilty individuals who chose to confess often said that their guilt 
was the reason they confessed (52.0%), whereas very few guilty people who accepted the plea 
indicated that their guilt was the reason (15.3%).  Further, several individuals (innocent and 
guilty) reported that they chose to accept the plea deal because they were afraid (11.8% and 
22.0%, respectively), whereas no individuals (innocent or guilty) cited fear as their reason for 
signing the confession.   
Interestingly, innocent individuals in both plea and confession conditions cited their own 
innocence as the predominant reason for refusing to sign the statement.  However, the remaining 
innocent individuals who refused to accept the plea provided a greater variety of responses than 
innocent individuals who refused to confess.  Most of the innocent individuals who refused to 
confess for reasons other than their own innocence cited the untrue nature of the accusation as 
their reason for refusal.  It could be argued post hoc, however, that these two responses are 
different ways of saying essentially the same thing.  Both responses (e.g., I’m innocent, the 
accusation is false) relate to the participants’ phenomenological knowledge of what actually 
occurred.  Consequently, if the Untrue and Innocent categories were collapsed together, then 
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almost all the innocent people who refused to confess cited knowledge of their innocence as their 
reason for refusal (only three individuals provided different responses).  In contrast, 25.5% (12) 
of innocent individuals in plea conditions provided reasons other than their own innocence for 
choosing to reject the plea deal.  In sum, it appears that one’s guilt or innocence is often a salient 
factor in the decision to sign a confession.  In contrast, a variety of decision-making and 
emotional factors beyond one’s guilt or innocence appear to be salient in the decision to sign a 
plea.  This finding supports the idea that plea outcomes can be impacted by different factors than 
confession outcomes, and are therefore deserving of separate study.   
Individual Difference Variables 
Positive-Negative Belief in a Just World 
 The current research also aimed to construct a new measure for belief in a just world.  
This new measure would recognize two dimensions of just world beliefs—a positive dimension 
and a negative dimension.  Although neither the Positive- nor Negative-Belief in a Just World 
measure achieved high reliability (both had Chronbach’s αs < .6), factor analyses supported each 
scale’s unidimensionality.  Further, correlation analyses showed that both scales correlated 
positively with Global Belief in a Just World and with each other.  However, the correlation 
between Positive- and Negative Belief in a Just World was much smaller than the correlations 
between each scale and Global Belief in a Just World.  Neither the Positive- nor Negative-Belief 
in a Just World measures interacted with innocence-guilt to moderate plea or confession 
outcomes. 
However, the Positive-Belief in a Just World measure was significantly correlated with 
self-esteem while the Negative-Belief in a Just World measure was not.  The Negative-Belief in 
a Just World measure however, was negatively correlated with the compassionate aspect of 
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agreeableness while the Positive-Belief in a Just World measure was not.  These two findings 
lend further support to the idea that belief in a just world can be measured on two different 
dimensions.  Interestingly, these correlations also help to illuminate how positive versus negative 
just world beliefs could be manifested.  Research has shown that just world beliefs can confer 
many prosocial behaviors such as forgiveness (Strelan, 2007; Testé & Perrin, 2013; Tomaka & 
Blascovich, 1994).  Just world beliefs can also contribute to behaviors such as victim-blaming or 
victim-derogation (Correia, Alves, Sutton, Ramos, Gouveia-Pereira, & Vala, 2012; Dalbert, 
2009).  It seems possible that Positive-Belief in a Just World captures more of the prosocial 
aspects of just world beliefs while Negative-Belief in a Just World captures the more negative 
outcomes.  
  Phenomenology of Innocence 
Private Self-Consciousness.  I had originally hypothesized that Private Self-
Consciousness could function as a proxy to the phenomenology of innocence.  Kassin (2005) 
named the illusion of transparency as a likely contributing factor to the phenomenology and 
Gilovich et al. (1998) found a positive correlation between the illusion of transparency and 
Private Self-Consciousness.  Thus, I predicted that innocent participants high in Private-Self 
Consciousness would be significantly more likely to reject a plea bargain than innocent 
participants low in Private Self-Consciousness.  I predicted the same trend for confession 
conditions.  On the other hand, Private-Self Consciousness would not have a clear impact on 
guilty participants’ propensity to reject a plea bargain or confession statement.  Unfortunately, 
Private Self-Consciousness did not appear to have a significant moderating impact on plea or 
confession outcomes, β = .51, Wald = .16, p = .69; β = -.30, Wald = .06, p = .80, respectively.  
Thus, Private Self-Consciousness might not be a good proxy measure for the phenomenology of 
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innocence; or, the conceptualization of the phenomenology of innocence might be inaccurate in 
some way. 
In summary, it appears that none of the individual difference variables reliably interacted 
with innocence-guilt to moderate plea or confession outcomes.  However, these null findings do 
not necessarily disaffirm the impact of individual differences on plea or confession decisions.  
Because the current study sample was composed entirely of Midwestern undergraduate college 
students, many potentially relevant variables could not be meaningfully examined (e.g., 
cognitive ability, race).  For instance, college students have already exceeded the average level 
of education among many criminal suspects and consequently, represent a restricted range of the 
larger spectrum of cognitive abilities (Redlich, 2010a).  College students also tend to score 
higher on self-esteem measures than the rest of the population.  Thus, the characteristics of the 
study sample restrict the range of many individual difference variables thereby masking their 
potential impact on plea and confession outcomes.  
It is also possible that data from the current study accurately reflects the trivial impact of 
many individual differences on plea and confession outcomes.  Powerful situations can limit 
individuality such that the behaviors of almost everyone can be predictably influenced.  Social 
psychologists have supported this tenet in countless research studies making participants—
regardless of their innate individual differences—more aggressive, more submissive, less 
forgiving, more rational, less self-assured, etc.  Similarly, the current research could have created 
such a high-stress environment that participants’ personalities were overshadowed by the power 
of the situation.  In conclusion, the homogeneity of the current study sample could have masked 
the impact of individual differences that do impact plea and confession outcomes in the real 
world; or, the power of plea and confession situations could reduce the impact of individual 
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differences in both the lab and in the real world.  In other words, a greater diversity of 
participants might remain inconsequential in the face of powerful plea and interrogation 
situations.    
Limitations of the Paradigm 
 Although the current research successfully captured several differences between pleas 
and confessions, other differences could not be measured with the current experimental 
paradigm.  The current study could not capture the temporal and procedural differences between 
pleas and confessions.  Defendants are typically pressured to confess during an interrogation that 
occurs relatively early in the investigative process.  Interrogations often occur in high-stress 
environments in which the defendant feels trapped.  It is possible that the stress of this situation 
disallows clear, rational decision-making.  In contrast, pleas are offered to defendants much later 
in the investigative process.  Plea negotiations ‘occur in the light of day.’  When defendants 
consider pleas, it is well after the event, well after some kind of arrest, well after any 
interrogation, and under conditions that are usually less time pressured.  Thus, confession 
decisions are typically made in a more emotional, hot cognitive state whereas plea decisions are 
made in a more rational, cold cognitive state.   
 The current experimental paradigm could not be ethically modified to mimic this 
temporal difference.  Participants in plea conditions cannot be granted days to consider the plea 
offer; such a change would result in delaying their debriefing by days.  The stressful nature of 
this study requires that every participant be relieved of the belief that they are being accused of 
cheating as soon as possible.  Leaving people in that level of stress for a period of days would be 
ethically untenable.  This particular limitation could have reduced the potential of the current 
research to discover differences between pleas and confessions by making them more similar 
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than they are in the real world.  Perhaps a future study could attempt to mimic more of the 
procedural differences between pleas and confessions.  For instance, participants could be asked 
to admit their guilt prior to being offered a plea.  Such a study would not be well suited toward 
the current research goal of examining the differences between confessions and pleas.  Rather, 
this type of study could further illuminate the relationship between pleas and confessions.  For 
instance, the findings could further support the notion that people who confess are more likely to 
subsequently accept pleas (Redlich 2010a; Kassin, 2012).   
 Among the social dynamics not readily captured in the proposed experimental paradigm 
is the role of one’s own defense counsel.  There are a number of pragmatic reasons for this 
limitation.  One, it would be extremely difficult to accurately mimic the advice that a defense 
attorney would provide to a defendant.  Two, plea negotiations do not necessarily involve a 
defense attorney.  Defendants can decide to accept a plea without the advice of counsel pro se.  
Three, although the advice of counsel plays a role in plea negotiations, the final decision is 
always left to the defendant.  The defendant is the person who has to stand up in court and 
publicly agree to the terms of the plea deal.   
 Finally, it is difficult to determine how readily results from the current research could be 
generalized to real-world cases with severe punishments.  Twenty hours of lab work cannot be 
easily compared to 20 years in prison.  Unfortunately, this limitation cannot be easily overcome 
with the current paradigm.  It would be both difficult and ethically dubious to convince 
participants that they could face punishments as severe as a prison sentence. However, it is 
important to note that most crimes come with minimal jail sentences and sometimes include no 
sentences at all.  Such minor cases are much more common than the severe cases that would 
require years of jail time.  Thus, although it is unclear how easily these results could be applied 
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to more severe cases, they can be more readily applied to the less severe and more frequent 
cases.    
Recommendations 
 The results of the current study do not offer any direct evidence for specific policy 
recommendations.  However, the alarmingly high rate of false plea acceptance does seem to 
advocate for the system to be changed in some way (a comparable false plea rate was found by 
Wilford, 2012 as well).  An analysis of participants’ reported reasons for choosing to accept plea 
deals also provide support for reform.  Of particular relevance is the surprisingly common 
occurrence of participant-suspects citing fear as their reason for pleading (none of the 
participant-suspects who confessed cited fear as their reason).  The legal system assumes that 
pleas involve an actual bargaining process in which both parties (i.e., the State and the suspect) 
possess some power to ensure that a fair resolution is agreed upon.  But, if fear is a common 
motivation among suspects accepting a plea, then perhaps the bargaining component of plea 
deals is more one-sided than the legal system would assume.     
Importantly, some legal scholars have begun to recommend various plea bargaining 
reforms.  Of course, these recommendations are entirely theoretical and have never been 
experimentally tested.  One such suggestion is referred to as a ‘plea-based ceiling’ (Covey, 
2008).  These ceilings would require that the maximum penalty a defendant could face at trial be 
tied to the penalties offered during plea negotiations (Covey, 2008; Bar-Gill & Gazal-Ayal, 
2006).  More specifically, defendants could not be subjected to post-trial sentences that exceed 
the sentence offered during plea negotiations by some reasonable and predetermined amount 
(this could be a specific value or a percentage).  For instance, if the plea-ceiling was set at 25%, a 
suspect accused of theft and offered a plea for a sentence of eight months in prison could not be 
  
	  
97 
subjected to a sentence exceeding ten months if convicted at trial.  This type of requirement 
could help to reduce the potential coercion felt by innocent suspects who are afraid of the 
increased risk in going to trial.     
Another proposed solution involves a partial ban on plea bargains.  Essentially, this 
proposal would not require that plea-bargaining be banned entirely, just that they be banned in 
“weak” cases (Gazal-Ayal, 2006).  Weak cases would be those for which the State has compiled 
little evidence against the suspect.  In contrast, stronger cases could still be resolved in plea 
negotiations.  This proposal could better protect the innocent who would presumably have less 
evidence against them by ensuring that their cases are scrutinized in trials.     
Other recommendations for reform focus on the aftermath of accepting a plea deal.  For 
instance, many jurisdictions ban defendants who accept a plea from pursuing several 
constitutionally granted post-conviction remedies; some jurisdictions even ban post-conviction 
DNA testing (Stephens, 2013).  These bans effectively rob defendants of their right to appeal 
their convictions simply because their conviction was the result of a plea rather than a trial.  
Given the overwhelming proportion of cases adjudicated by plea, it is frightening to consider 
how few convicted criminals in the United States have access to post-conviction remedies.    
Again, these laws seem to be justified by an assumption of the legal system that defendants who 
plea are typically doing so because they are guilty and just want a sentencing discount—that they 
would have been just as likely to confess if confessing came with perks.  Unfortunately, data 
from the current study call that assumption into question.  Very few people who pled were 
concerned with whether they were guilty or innocent, they were more often concerned with 
taking an easier alternative or were motivated by fear of suffering worse consequences.  Thus, 
the factors that drive one to confess are distinct from those that drive one to plea and innocence-
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guilt has little impact on the latter. The current results clearly show that the innocent can be 
coerced to accept a plea.  Consequently, the results lend support to the contention that those who 
plea should maintain their rights to post-conviction appeals (Stephens, 2013).       
Finally, in order to determine the factors that could contribute to the innocent’s 
willingness to accept a plea deal, the plea process needs to be more transparent.  All plea deals 
offered to a defendant (even if rejected) should be written down and kept on file; in the same 
way that evidence from a crime scene is recorded and preserved by the State.  This could help to 
ensure that illegal practices (such as lying to the defendant about evidence) are not occurring.  
Further, given the variability in the language and questions included in plea colloquies 
across jurisdictions (Redlich, 2012), it seems a sensible recommendation would be to require that 
plea colloquies be video-recorded.  Current law requires that a verbatim transcript must be 
constructed to document in-court plea bargain proceedings.  However, transcripts are unable to 
capture many in-court variables that could be relevant when evaluating a plea deal (e.g., emotion, 
facial expressions, long pauses, etc.).  Videotaped plea colloquies would also provide some 
assurance that judges are not simply rubber-stamping deals without critically assessing their 
merit.  These videos could also help to illuminate any national standards (or the absence of 
national standards) regarding the criterion for evidence in a standard versus nolo contendere or 
Alford plea case.  Videotapes would also be a valuable resource to prosecutors if defendants 
appeal cases based on claims that their conviction was attained by questionable means.  A 
pristine video of the plea colloquy could support any claim by the State that defendants were 
provided with all of their rights and that no coercion or illegal procedures occurred at the time 
the plea deal was accepted.  Video recording is a common recommendation for legal reforms.  It 
was one of the primary reforms included in the American Psychological Association White 
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Paper addressing recommendations for reform in interrogation procedures (Kassin, Drizin, 
Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010).  Steblay, Wells, and Douglass (2014) also 
recommend that eyewitness identification procedures be videotaped.  Video recording is a 
valuable method for the preservation of many types of legal procedures—it is one of the best 
methods for ensuring that recommended procedures were followed and that no steps were 
skipped.   
These recommendations are primarily theoretical and none were directly examined in the 
current study.  Of course none of these potential reforms are mutually exclusive and only 
continued research can validate their efficacy.   
Final Observations 
 I started this program of research because the acceptance of a plea criminally convicts 
United States citizens almost twenty times more often than a guilty verdict.  This state of affairs 
has been slowly building for the last century (Fisher, 2000).  By the late-1970s, the rate of plea 
conviction reached 80% and has continued increasing ever since (Oppel, 2011).  This increase 
coincided with new laws that increased prosecutorial discretion, and a series of opinions from the 
Supreme Court recognizing and regulating plea practices (Boykin v. Alabama, Blackledge v. 
Allison, Brady v. United States, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, United States v. Goodwin, Stanobello v. 
New York, etc.).  All of these factors have coalesced to radically alter our justice system; a justice 
system founded in a Constitution that makes no mention of plea-bargaining.  Even our own U.S. 
Supreme Court has been forced to describe our justice system as “…a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials” (pg. 3, Lafler v. Cooper, 2012).  As social scientists, what have we been doing 
to question the rapid development of this new system of justice? 
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 This dissertation was an attempt to examine the viability of an experimental paradigm 
that might help to address some important questions about the plea process.  The current research 
offers some evidence that the psychological processes involved in pleas are different from the 
psychological processes involved in confessions.  And there is some evidence that individual 
differences might put some innocent people at risk more than others (Wilford, 2012).  But there 
is abundant evidence that pleas do not do a very good job of separating the innocent from the 
guilty.  The current research found that plea acceptance increased the likelihood of guilt by only 
1.81 times, and previous research has found a diagnosticity ratio of only 1.52 (Wilford, 2012).  
Clearly, no one could claim that these ratios are representative of ratios in actual cases however, 
the factors involved in the innocent’s decision to accept pleas might very well be the same in the 
lab and in the real world (e.g., nearly 60% of the innocent participants who accepted pleas cited 
fear or pressure as their reason for doing so).  Just because there are limits on the generalizability 
of lab research to the real world does not mean that the lab cannot mimic the real world in 
meaningful ways.   
 This dissertation is not likely to have any measurable impact on the United States legal 
system.  But, it at least provides a start to testing the assumptions on which this pervasive legal 
practice has been based.  It is not possible to know what impact additional psycho-legal research 
could have on our future legal system.  But, consider the rise in eyewitness research that began 
with seminal studies in the 1970s and 1980s.  Over decades of research, social science has 
demonstrated the reliability of eyewitness procedures that reduce the probability of false 
eyewitness identifications (Steblay et al., 2014; Wells, 2014; Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2012).  
Consequently, many jurisdictions have responded to research by reforming their eyewitness 
procedures (e.g., the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio along with 
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other major cities and counties; Wells, Malpass, Lindsay, Fisher, Turtle, & Fulero, 2000).  
Perhaps thirty years from now, plea researchers can follow in the footsteps of eyewitness 
researchers and share in their success.   
 If social science researchers do not critically test the assumptions the legal system has 
made to justify plea-bargaining, reforms might never materialize.  Kerry Max Cook will remain 
convicted of the murder of Linda Jo Edwards, despite exonerating DNA evidence, because he 
accepted a plea (Cook, 2007).  Erma Faye Stewart, a victim of the Hearne drug sweep, will 
remain one of seven individuals convicted of drug charges, charges that were later dismissed, 
because they accepted a plea (Bikel, 2004).  Perhaps it is too late to spare these individuals, but 
in a legal system inspired by the formulation that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than 
that one innocent suffer,” perhaps it is time for the legal system to start rebalancing its priorities.          
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APPENDIX A. GLOBAL BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD SCALE (GBJWS) 
 
Below are several statements about beliefs you may or may not have.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.  __________ 
 
2. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.  __________ 
 
3. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.  __________ 
 
4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves.  __________ 
 
5. I feel that people get what they deserve.  __________ 
 
6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.  __________ 
 
 
7. I basically feel that the world is a fair place.  __________ 
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APPENDIX B. ROSENBERG SELF ESTEEM (RSE) SCALE 
 
Below are several statements about how you feel about yourself.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.  __________ 
 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.  __________ 
 
3. *All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.  __________ 
 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  __________ 
 
5. *I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  __________ 
 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.  __________ 
 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  __________ 
 
8. *I wish I could have more respect for myself.  __________ 
 
9. *I certainly feel useless at times.  __________ 
 
10. *At times I think I am no good at all.  __________ 
 
Note. *Denotes items that were reverse-coded.  
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APPENDIX C. POSITIVE-NEGATIVE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD SCALE 
 
Below are several statements about beliefs you may or may not have.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Positive-Belief in a Just World 
 
1. When people are good, they are rewarded.  __________  
 
2. *Being rich or well off is not an indication of a person’s character.  __________  
 
3. *Working hard often does not result in reward.  __________  
 
4. Being a good person results in having a good life.  __________  
 
5. I feel that people who do good deeds will be rewarded accordingly.  __________ 
 
6. *Many people who are rich do not deserve those riches.  __________ 
 
Negative-Belief in a Just World 
 
1. I feel like bad things generally happen to bad people.  __________ 
 
2. *People who commit crimes often get away with it.  __________  
 
3. People who suffer typically deserve it.  __________  
 
4. Victims of crime are often criminals themselves.  __________  
 
5. *Being raised in certain environments can cause one to commit crimes.  ________ 
 
6. *I feel that those who have done wrong often avoid punishment.  __________ 
 
Note. *Denotes items that were reverse-coded.  
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APPENDIX D. PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE 
 
Below are several statements about dispositions you may or may not believe you have.  
Please read each statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you feel 
each statement describes you personally.  Write down the number that corresponds to the 
level at which statement is characteristic or uncharacteristic of you. 
0 1 2 3 4 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 
Somewhat 
Uncharacteristic 
Neutral Somewhat 
Characteristic 
Extremely 
Characteristic 
 
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out.  __________ 
 
2. *Generally, I’m not very aware of myself.  __________  
 
3. I reflect about myself a lot.  __________  
 
4. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies.  __________  
 
5. *I never scrutinize myself.  __________  
 
6. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings.  __________  
 
7. I’m constantly examining my motives.  __________  
 
8. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself.  __________  
 
9. I’m alert to changes in my mood.  __________ 
 
10. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.  ________ 
 
Note. *Denotes items that were reverse-coded.
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5 
5 
APPENDIX E. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
1. Gender (check one) FEMALE_____ MALE_____ 
 
2. What is your age?   _______________ 
 
 
3.  Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent? 
 
 
1 
STRONG 
REPUBLICAN 
2 
NOT VERY 
STRONG 
REPUBLICAN 
3 
INDEPENDENT 
LEANING 
REPUBLICAN 
4 
INDEPENDENT 
5 
INDEPENDENT 
LEANING 
DEMOCRAT 
6 
NOT VERY 
STRONG 
DEMOCRAT 
7 
STRONG 
DEMOCRAT 
 
4.  Which of these opinions best represents your views? 
 
1 
EXTREMELY 
LIBERAL 
2 
LIBERAL 
3 
SLIGHTLY 
LIBERAL 
4 
MODERATE/
MIDDLE OF 
THE ROAD 
5 
SLIGHTLY 
CONSERVATIVE 
6 
CONSERVATIVE 
7 
EXTREMELY 
CONSERVATIVE 
 
5. What was your ACT composite score (estimate if necessary) ___________.  If you took 
this test more than once, report your highest score.  If you did not take the ACT, mark 
this box: 
 
6. Compared to others, how high was your ACT composite score?  If you took this test 
more than once, respond with respect to your highest score.  If you did not take the ACT, 
mark this box: 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
MUCH LOWER 
THAN AVERAGE 
LOWER THAN 
AVERAGE 
AVERAGE HIGHER THAN 
AVERAGE 
MUCH HIGHER 
THAN AVERAGE 
7. What is your major? ____________________________________ 
 
 
8. Are you currently intending to go to graduate school? YES  NO 
 
a. If so, what type of degree are you planning to pursue? 
 
Masters    Ph.D.    J.D. 
 
M.D. (or other medical degree)  Other ______________________ 
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APPENDIX F. BIG FIVE-ASPECT SCALE (BFAS) 
Below are several statements about what you think about yourself.  Please read each 
statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you think each statement 
describes you by writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Neuroticism 
1. I get angry easily.  __________ 
2. I get upset easily.  __________ 
3. I change my mood a lot.  __________ 
4. I am a person whose moods go up and down easily.  __________ 
5. I get easily agitated.  __________ 
6. I can be stirred up easily.  __________ 
7. *I rarely get irritated.  __________ 
8. *I keep my emotions under control.  __________ 
9. *I rarely lose my composure.  __________ 
10.   *I am not easily annoyed.  __________ 
11.   I am filled with doubts about things.  __________ 
 
12.   I feel threatened easily.  __________ 
 
13.   I worry about things.  __________ 
 
14.   I am easily discouraged.  __________ 
 
15.   I become overwhelmed by events.  __________ 
 
16.   I am afraid of many things.  __________ 
 
17.   *I seldom feel blue.  __________ 
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18.   *I feel comfortable with myself.  __________ 
 
19.   *I rarely feel depressed.  __________ 
 
20.   *I am not embarrassed easily.  __________ 
 
Agreeableness 
 
21.   I feel others’ emotions.  __________ 
 
22.   I inquire about others’ well being.  __________ 
 
23.   I sympathize with others’ feelings.  __________ 
 
24.   I take an interest in other people’s lives.  __________ 
 
25.   I like to do things for others.  __________ 
 
26.   *I am not interested in other people’s problems.  __________ 
 
27.   *I can’t be bothered with other’s needs.  __________ 
 
28.   *I am indifferent to the feelings of others.  __________ 
 
29.   *I take no time for others.  __________ 
 
30.   I don’t have a soft side.  __________ 
 
31.   I respect authority.  __________ 
 
32.   I hate to seem pushy.  __________ 
 
33.   I avoid imposing my will on others.  __________ 
 
34.   I rarely put people under pressure.  __________ 
 
35.   *I insult people.  __________ 
 
36.   *I believe that I am better than others.  __________ 
 
37.   *I take advantage of others.  __________ 
 
38.   *I seek conflict.  __________ 
 
39.   *I love a good fight.  __________ 
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40.   *I am out for my own personal gain.  __________ 
 
Conscientiousness 
 
41.   I carry out my plans.  __________ 
 
42.   I finish what I start.  __________ 
 
43.   I get things done quickly.  __________ 
 
44.   I always know what I am doing.  __________ 
 
45.   *I waste my time.  __________ 
 
46.   *I find it difficult to get down to work.  __________ 
 
47.   *I mess things up.  __________ 
 
48.   *I don’t put my mind on the task at hand.  __________ 
 
49.   *I postpone decisions.  __________ 
 
50.   *I am easily distracted.  __________ 
 
51.   I like order.  __________ 
 
52.   I keep things tidy.  __________ 
 
53.   I follow a schedule.  __________ 
 
54.   I want everything to be “just right” .  __________ 
 
55.   I see that rules are observed.  __________ 
 
56.   I want every detail taken care of.  __________ 
 
57.   *I leave my belongings around.  __________ 
 
58.   *I am not bothered by messy people.  __________ 
 
59.   *I am not bothered by disorder.  __________ 
 
60.   *I dislike routine.  __________ 
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Extraversion 
 
61.   I make friends easily.  __________ 
 
62.   I warm up quickly to others.  __________ 
 
63.   I show my feelings when I’m happy.  __________ 
 
64.   I have a lot of fun.  __________. 
 
65.   I laugh a lot.  __________ 
 
66.   *I am hard to get to know.  __________ 
 
67.   *I keep others at a distance.  __________ 
 
68.   *I reveal little about myself.  __________ 
 
69.   *I rarely get caught up in the excitement.  __________ 
 
70.   *I am not a very enthusiastic person.  __________ 
 
71.   I take charge.  __________ 
 
72.   I have a strong personality.  __________ 
 
73.   I know how to captivate people.  __________ 
 
74.   I see myself as a good leader.  __________. 
 
75.   I can talk others into doing things.  __________ 
 
76.   I am the first to act.  __________ 
 
77.   *I do not have an assertive personality.  __________ 
 
78.   *I lack the talent for influencing people.  __________ 
 
79.   *I wait for others to lead the way.  __________ 
 
80.   *I hold back my opinions.  __________ 
 
Openness 
 
81.   I am quick to understand things.  __________ 
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82.   I can handle a lot of information.  __________ 
 
83.   I like to solve complex problems.  __________ 
 
84.   I have a rich vocabulary.  __________ 
 
85.   I think quickly.  __________ 
 
86.   I formulate ideas clearly.  __________ 
 
87.   *I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.  __________ 
 
88.   *I avoid philosophical discussions.  __________ 
 
89.   *I avoid difficult reading material.  __________ 
 
90.   *I learn things slowly.  __________ 
 
91.   I enjoy the beauty of nature.  __________ 
 
92.   I believe in the importance of art.  __________ 
 
93.   I love to reflect on things.  __________ 
 
94.   I get deeply immersed in music.  __________ 
 
95.   I see beauty in things that others might not notice.  __________ 
 
96.   I need a creative outlet.  __________ 
 
97.   *I do not like poetry.  __________ 
 
98.   *I seldom get lost in thought.  __________ 
 
99.   *I seldom daydream.  __________ 
 
100.   *I seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.  __________ 
 
Note. *Denotes items that were reverse-coded.  
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APPENDIX G. INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS 
 
Individual Problem # 1 
Suppose you are a bus driver.  On the first stop you pick up 6 men and 2 women.  At 
the second stop 2 men leave and 1 woman boards the bus.  At the third stop 1 man 
leaves and 2 women enter the bus.  At the fourth stop 3 men get on and 3 women get 
off.  At the fifth stop, 2 men get off, 3 men get on, 1 woman gets off, and 2 women get 
on.  How many men are left on the bus, how many women are left on the bus, and what 
is the bus driver’s name? 
 
How many men are left on the bus?  _____________ 
 
How many women are left on the bus?  _____________ 
 
What is the bus driver’s name?  ________________ 
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Individual Problem #2 
 
 
 
How many triangles can you find in the figure above?  Look carefully – there are more 
than 16! 
 
 
Answer:  _____________ 
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APPENDIX H. TEAM PROBLEMS 
Team Problem #1 
Starting with the word “COOL”, change one letter at a time until you have the word 
“HEAT”.  Each change must result in a proper word, and you can use any letters in 
the alphabet.  Keeping in mind that you can only change one letter per step, what is the 
minimum number of steps required to achieve this change?  What are the steps? 
 
 
 
 
 
Answer (Give Steps, i.e., the 
words):________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________         
________________________________________________________         
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Team Problem # 2 
 
Right now Bethany is 12.  You can find her older brother's age by switching the digits in 
Bethany's age.  They'll be able to switch the digits in their ages again sometime in the 
future.  How old will Bethany and her brother be when this happens?  
 
 
 
 
How old will Bethany be?  ___________ 
 
How old will Bethany’s brother be?  __________ 
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APPENDIX I. PARTNER IMPRESSIONS 
 
1. Please rate your partner (the other participant) on the following characteristics:  
 
 
2. What did you like best about your partner?        
             
             
 
3. What did you like least about your partner?        
             
             
 
4. If presented with additional logic problems, would you prefer to continue working with the 
same partner or be assigned to a different partner? Please respond on the following scale:  
 
 
unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 friendly 
quiet 1 2 3 4 5 talkative 
dependent 1 2 3 4 5 independent 
unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 intelligent 
needy 1 2 3 4 5 self-reliant 
unlikeable 1 2 3 4 5 likeable 
followed directions 
poorly 
1 2 3 4 5 followed directions well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for a 
different 
partner 
Slight 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Moderate 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
Strong 
preference 
for the 
same 
partner 
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Please read each below statement carefully.  Use the scale below to indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with each statement by writing down the number that corresponds to 
your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
5. My partner (the other participant) was competent.  __________ 
 
6. My partner was aggressive towards me.  __________ 
 
7. My partner was honest.  __________ 
 
8. My partner was friendly.  __________ 
 
 
9. The experimenter was competent.  __________ 
 
10. The experimenter was aggressive towards me.  __________ 
 
11. The experimenter showed humanity towards me.  __________ 
 
12. The experimenter was honest.  __________ 
 
Use the scale below to indicate how much you experienced the emotions listed below by 
writing down the number that corresponds to your level of agreement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I didn’t feel 
like this at all 
I felt like this 
a little 
  I felt like this 
a while  
I felt like this 
a lot 
13.  Guilty  __________ 
14.  Anxious  __________ 
15.  Stressed  __________ 
16.  Pressured  __________ 
17.  Defensive  __________ 
18.  Cheated  __________ 
19.  Angry  __________ 
20.  Insulted  __________ 
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APPENDIX J. POST-ACCUSATION MEASURES 
 
QUESTIONS DIFFER BY CONDITIONS!! 
 
1) For participants who AGREED to sign the statement: Why did you agree to sign the 
statement?  
 
2) For participants who AGREED to sign the statement: What benefit do you believe you were 
gaining by signing the statement?  
 
3) For participants who AGREED to sign the statement:  Given the evidence in the current 
situation, if you hadn’t signed the statement— 
 
How likely is it that you would have been charged with cheating? 
 
I’d like you to respond on a 10-point scale from 1 being extremely unlikely to 10 being 
extremely likely.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
        Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
1) For participants who REFUSED to sign the statement: Why did you refuse to sign the 
statement? 
 
2) For participants who REFUSED to sign the statement: What benefit do you believe you were 
gaining by NOT signing the statement? 
 
3) For participants who REFUSED to sign the statement:  Given the evidence in the current 
situation— 
 
How likely is it that you will be charged with cheating? 
I’d like you to respond on a 10-point scale from 1 being extremely unlikely to 10 being 
extremely likely.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
        Extremely 
Likely 
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4) How willing were you to accept the statement offered to you? 
 
A. Not at all willing 
B. A little willing 
C. Somewhat willing 
D. Pretty willing 
E. Very willing 
F. Totally willing 
 
5) Did you feel the evidence against you regarding the cheating accusation was strong? 
 
A. Very strong 
B. Somewhat strong 
C. Slightly strong 
D. Neutral 
E. Slightly weak 
F. Somewhat weak 
G. Very weak 
 
6) Did you feel the evidence against you regarding the cheating accusation was plausible? 
 
A. Very plausible 
B. Somewhat plausible 
C. Slightly plausible 
D. Neutral 
E. Not at all plausible 
 
7) Did you feel trapped into signing the statement? 
 
A. Totally trapped 
B. Somewhat trapped 
C. Slightly trapped 
D. Neutral 
E. Not at all trapped 
 
8) Were you frightened by the consequences of not agreeing to the statement? 
 
A. Very frightened 
B. Somewhat frightened 
C. Slightly frightened 
D. Neutral 
E. Not at all frightened 
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9) Why were you (or were you not) frightened? 
 
 
10) How anxious were you when I accused you of cheating on the triangle problem?   
So, would you say you were… 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
anxious 
Slightly anxious Neutral Somewhat 
anxious 
Totally anxious 
 
11) I’d also like to know much pressure you felt to sign the statement? I’d like you to respond on 
a 10-point scale again from 1 being no pressure at all to 10 being as much pressure as you 
could imagine.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No 
pressure 
at all 
        Most 
pressure 
I could 
imagine 
 
 
NEXT QUESTIONS DIFFER BY CONDITIONS!! 
 
12) For participants in BLUFF conditions: Did the existence of the video make you more willing 
to sign the statement, less willing, or did it not have an effect on your decision?   
 
A.  If they say MORE willing, ask: On a scale of 1 to 10, how much more willing 
were you to sign the statement because of the existence of the video? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not 
Much 
More 
Willing 
   Somewhat 
More 
Willing 
   Much 
More 
Willing 
 
B.  If they say LESS willing, ask: On a scale of 1 to 10, how much less willing were 
you to sign the statement because of the existence of the video? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not 
Much 
Less 
Willing 
   Somewhat 
Less 
Willing 
   Much 
Less 
Willing 
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13) Do you have any questions about the experiment? 
I just want to make sure that you understand what the purpose of the experiment is. So, can 
you tell me in your own words, what we’re looking at in this experiment?  
 
14) Thinking back, which of the following statements best reflects what you were thinking at the 
time that I accused you of cheating?  
 
A. I totally believed everything that you said. 
B. The whole situation seemed very believable to me. 
C. I thought to myself “This might be serious”. 
D. I thought to myself “I may be in trouble here”. 
E. I didn’t know what to think. 
F. I wasn’t sure what was going on. 
G. I really didn’t think anything one way or the other, I just reacted. 
 
H. I wasn’t sure whether it was staged or real. 
  Follow-up: At what point did you begin to wonder?      
 
I. I thought that it was probably an act, but wasn’t sure.  
  Follow-up: At what point did you begin to think that?      
 
J. I absolutely knew it was staged. 
  Follow-up: At what point did you become absolutely sure?    
 
 
FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO AGREED TO SIGN THE STATEMENT: 
 
15)  Thinking back, which of the following statements best explains why you signed the 
statement. 
 
A. I thought I would get in less trouble.  
B. I thought signing would just put an end to the whole thing.  
C. I was afraid of what might happen if I didn’t sign. 
D. I didn’t think it mattered if I signed or not. 
 
FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO REFUSED TO SIGN THE STATEMENT: 
 
15) Thinking back, which of the following statements best explains why you refused to sign the 
statement. 
 
1. I thought I would get in less trouble.  
2. I thought I could convince the experimenter or committee that I did not cheat.  
3. I was afraid of what might happen if I signed. 
4. I didn’t think it mattered if I signed or not. 
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16) How relieved were you when I told you that the whole thing was staged and you weren’t in 
any trouble at all? 
 
1. not at all relieved 
2. a little relieved 
3. moderately relieved 
4. quite relieved 
5. extremely relieved 
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APPENDIX K. COUNSELING SERVICES INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Counseling Services 
 
The Iowa State University Counseling Service provides counseling to Iowa State University students. 
Below is information about eligibility and cost. Additional information can be obtained by calling 294-
5056 or visiting the counseling services website: www.public.iastate.edu/~stdtcouns/homepage.html 
 
Eligibility for Services 
• Clinical	  services	  are	  offered	  to	  enrolled	  students	  of	  ISU.	  This	  may	  include	  non-­‐student	  partners	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  couples	  counseling.	  Clinical	  services	  are	  offered	  in	  group	  mode	  and	  individual	  mode.	  	  
• Career	  counseling	  is	  offered	  to	  students	  and	  potential	  students.	  	  
• Consultation	  services	  are	  offered	  to	  students,	  faculty,	  staff	  and	  parents.	  	  
• The	  Testing	  Service	  serves	  students	  and	  non-­‐students.	  	  
 
Students who are under 18 may be requested to obtain the written permission of a parent or guardian to 
receive treatment. Such students may be seen for an assessment without written parental release.  
SCS intends to be as helpful as possible to all members of the university community on behalf of 
students. If you have a question, call us and ask.  
 
Cost of Services 
Most professional services of the SCS are provided by the university at no charge to the student. When 
testing is recommended, there is a minimum fee designed to recuperate the cost of the test. This fee can 
be charged to the student's U-bill if desired.  
In order to encourage consistency of care to our clients and increase efficiency of the service to all, SCS 
will charge $10 for uncancelled missed appointments, which will be charged to your ubill. 
 
Crisis Services  
If you have an urgent matter and feel it would be important to speak to a counselor as soon as possible, 
please call the SCS desk at 294-5056 and let the receptionist know that you are requesting a same-day 
crisis appointment or simply come to our office in the Student Services Building on the 3rd floor. SCS 
counselors save some appointments each day for such matters. If this is after hours or on a 
weekend/holiday when SCS is not open, and you feel it is important to speak to someone, you may call 
the Richmond Center at 515-232-5811.  
	  
 
  
  
	  
124 
APPENDIX L. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RELIABILITY MEASURES FOR 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE INDICES 
 
 
Range 
Low           High 
Mean (SD) 
Cronbach’s 
α 
Global Belief in a Just World  1.00 5.60 3.57 (.69) .76 
Self-Esteem  2.60 7.00 5.58 (.89) .86 
Private Self-Consciousness (N = 246) 0.80 3.70 2.58 (.44) .51 
Neuroticism      
Volatility 1.00 6.00 3.18 (1.06) .89 
Withdrawal 1.10 6.60 3.40 (.91) .80 
Agreeableness      
Compassion 3.10 7.00 5.72 (.77) .86 
Politeness 2.60 7.00 5.43 (.78) .77 
Conscientiousness      
Industriousness 2.00 6.80 4.64 (.91) .84 
Orderliness 2.00 7.00 4.83 (.96) .84 
Extraversion     
Enthusiasm 1.30 7.00 5.40 (.97) .89 
Assertiveness 1.10 7.00 4.84 (1.00) .90 
Openness     
Openness 2.10 7.00 4.97 (1.00) .83 
Intelligence 1.90 7.00 4.68 (.95) .85 
Note. N = 422 (for all measures except Private Self-Consciousness, which was added later in the study and has an N 
of 246).  All items for which strong agreement would imply lower endorsement of the relevant trait were reverse-
coded.  The measures were then averaged and aggregated into single indices.  The Big Five Aspects and self-esteem 
were measured on 7-point Likert-type scales.  Global Belief in a Just World was measured on a 6-point scale and 
Private Self-Consciousness was measured on a 5-point Likert scale.  
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APPENDIX M. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR POST-ACCUSATION MEASURES 
BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDTIONS 
 
Measure 
Innocent-
Guilty 
Confession-
Plea 
Bluff N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Likelihood of Charge 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 2.11 1.89 
 Bluff 42 1.50 1.27 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 2.41 2.06 
 Bluff 40 1.20 .52 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 5.23 2.71 
 Bluff 42 4.56 2.65 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 4.08 2.81 
 Bluff 39 4.15 2.81 
Willingness to Sign 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 1.42 1.00 
 Bluff 42 1.88 1.15 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 2.00 1.19 
 Bluff 40 1.78 1.07 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 3.57 1.67 
 Bluff 42 2.98 1.51 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 3.28 1.88 
 Bluff 40 2.90 1.63 
Strength of Evidence 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 1.68 1.09 
 Bluff 42 2.24 1.86 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 1.62 1.45 
 Bluff 40 1.38 1.10 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 3.90 2.22 
 Bluff 42 3.40 2.19 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 2.63 1.85 
 Bluff 39 3.33 2.42 
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Appendix M. (continued) 
Measure 
Innocent-
Guilty 
Confession-
Plea 
Bluff N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Plausibility of Evidence 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 2.34 1.38 
 Bluff 42 2.31 1.39 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 2.36 1.51 
 Bluff 40 1.75 1.19 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 3.45 1.21 
 Bluff 42 3.21 1.47 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 2.78 1.44 
 Bluff 39 3.18 1.55 
Trapped Into Signing 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 2.82 1.69 
 Bluff 42 2.67 1.44 
 
Plea 
No Buff 41 2.90 1.48 
 Bluff 40 2.88 1.44 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 2.81 1.47 
 Bluff 42 3.24 1.51 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 39 3.59 1.39 
 Bluff 161 2.94 2.55 
Fear of Consequences 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 2.58 1.41 
 Bluff 42 2.31 1.46 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 2.95 1.48 
 Bluff 40 2.78 1.44 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 3.17 1.53 
 Bluff 42 3.26 1.56 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 3.88 1.28 
 Bluff 39 3.67 1.26 
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Appendix M. (continued) 
Measure 
Innocent-
Guilty 
Confession-
Plea 
Bluff N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Anxiety During Accusation 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 3.05 1.47 
 Bluff 42 2.52 1.33 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 2.86 1.35 
 Bluff 39 2.23 1.18 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 3.55 1.23 
 Bluff 43 3.40 1.26 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 3.33 1.40 
 Bluff 39 3.49 1.35 
Pressure to Sign 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 38 5.45 2.75 
 Bluff 42 5.17 2.32 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 5.64 2.59 
 Bluff 39 4.93 2.42 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 42 6.38 1.99 
 Bluff 43 6.19 2.20 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 6.41 2.06 
 Bluff 39 6.90 2.16 
Relief from Debriefing 
 
Innocent 
Confession 
No Bluff 37 3.27 1.19 
 Bluff 42 2.86 1.26 
 
Plea 
No Buff 42 3.14 1.22 
 Bluff 39 2.87 1.34 
 
Guilty 
Confession 
No Buff 43 3.81 1.12 
 Bluff 42 3.41 1.27 
 
Plea 
No Bluff 40 3.40 1.19 
 Bluff 39 3.39 1.25 
Note. N = 328.  All items for which high values would imply lower endorsement of the relevant measures were 
reverse-coded.  Evidence plausibility, trapped into signing, fear of consequences, anxiety during accusation, and 
relief after debriefing were measured on five-point Likert scales.  Likelihood of charge and pressure to sign were 
measured on ten-point Likert-type scales; evidence strength was measured on a seven-point scale; willingness to 
sign was measured on a six-point scale. 
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